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Recent Economic Development and Outlook in Industrial Countries
by Adolf Ahnefeld, Dietmar Gebert, Jiirgen Roth,
Joachim Scheide, and Norbert Walter
AUS DEM INHALT
The upswing in Europe, North America and Japan since mid-1975 has been unsteady.
It has been sufficiently modest to allow a — however slight — decline of inflation rates.
Since economic policy refrained from massive reflation, the shortrun outlook remains for
a moderate recovery with no rekindling of inflation.
High unemployment and weak investment can partly be attributed to the abrupt change
to a restrictive course in 1973/1974 which led to unintended increases of real wages
and to a dramatic profit squeeze. Moreover, there have been increasing changes in
the structure of demand and production techniques as well as political uncertainties
which have prevented a marked improvement of the investment climate. This diagnosis
calls for a steady economic policy, less aggressive wage policy, and incentives to
promote innovative spirit and risk taking.
Although money illusion and exchange rate illusion have largely vanished and reduced
the effectiveness of short-term stimulation measures, most countries are far from pursuing
a steady and pre-announced course.
In strong countries — the United States, West Germany and Japan — the reduction of
the share of public absorption especially through a shortfall of public investment since
1974 was a retarding factor for improving employment and growth. In weak countries
— for example the United Kingdom and Italy — an easy money policy continued to
produce high inflation rates and increasing external imbalances. Only after drastic
exchange rate depreciations in 1976 did these countries — sometimes too drastically —
turn to a restrictive policy course.
Cooperation in matters of economic policy, often misunderstood as the sharing of evils,
should be designed as help for self-help. International credits should be granted under
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Introduction
In this report it is tried to present a general analysis of the
present stance of the cycle and the outlook. This part is
rather compressed in order to leave room for a more intensive
discussion of the most relevant problems of the present
economic situation: firstly, about causes and cures for un-
employment; secondly, about the weakness of investment.
The last part of the report concerns the formulation of an
economic policy strategy which is suited to promote growth
without inflation and to avoid international disequilibria.
Highlights of the Report
1. The present recovery is to be qualified as an unsteady and rather
- modest one. The "engines" of the recovery are not far ahead of
those countries which follow up. The upswing ist mostly consumpt-
ion-led and is accompanied by a sharp turnaround in inventories
and a rather strong increase of international trade. During the
recovery trade balance disequilibria have again increased coincid-
ing with substantial exchange rate changes. Inflation differentials
remained high; inflation rates decreased, however, not at a rapid
pace.
2. The outlook for economic activity in 1977 is rather moderate as
well. Again the United States, Japan and West Germany will be
the fore-runners. While these engine countries will achieve an
increase of capacity utilization and some progress in employment,
most western European countries will experience no increase ofutilization levels and a stagnation at labour markets. Inflation
will decline, however, modestly. Current balance disequilibria
will decrease slightly, thus somewhat relieving pressure on
exchange rates.
3. As the main causes for unemployment the combination of the fol-
lowing factors could be identified:
- the abrupt monetary and fiscal restriction in 1973 and 1974;
- the abrupt rise of the oil price;
- the intensification of the fight on the income distribution
during most of the seventies;
- the rigidities in the wage structure as to regions and to
professions.
No remedy for a short-term success at the unemployment front
could be found. A number of measures are suggested to improve
the employment situation in the medium run. Governments'help
for more mobility is looked upon to be subsidiary. The main means
to bring about higher employment is for the unions and employers
in negotiating wages increases below productivity gains. This rule
is to be followed as long as employment is looked upon to be too
low.
4. Many of the factors causing unemployment are responsible for the
weakness of investment as well. The profit squeeze developing in
the seventies and accentuated in 1973/1974 is by far not corrected
by the development in 1976. Additionally, structural changes as to
demand and production techniques, as well as political uncertainty
have hindered a more favourable investment development up to now.
5. Economic policy has undergone significant changes during the
seventies. The Bretton Woods System was substituted by a mani-
pulated float system. Anticyclical fiscal policy, looked upon as the-5-
main means of economic policy throughout the fifties and sixties,
proved to be less and less successful. Monetary policy, rather
unimportant in the past two decades, became subject of major inter-
est. Trendorientation - at least as the basic philosophy - was sub-
stituting anticyclical strategies.
Against this background, present pressures of the OECD and the
Carter-Administration to reflate in so-called strong economies
are analyzed and evalued. While in many countries fiscal stimuli
designed to support investment in the medium and longer run are
desirable, neither short-term fiscal injections nor easy money
policy should be pursued. International credits, which per se delay
adjustment processes, should only be given, if they include
obligations to introduce policies to cure the imbalances in both
surplus and deficit countries.-7-
A. Recent Economic Development and Outlook
I. The History of the 1974/1975 Recession Reconsidered
1. After a seesaw development of business cycles in most of the six-
ties, the seventies can easily be qualified as a period of a world-
wide synchronized economic cycle. This difference be tween the two
decades has its roots in a number.of factors:
- the intensification of international trade and international capital
movements,
- the intensification of the international exchange of information
on government and private (especially firms) levels,
- the change from a jumping peg-system to a manipulated floating
system,
- the oil crisis and the development of the North-South conflict,
- and - probably as a result of all of the above mentioned factors -
an increasing international synchronization of economic policy.
In the course of last years anticyclical fiscal policy - since it was
looked upon to be less and less effective - lost the dominating
position; instead a renaissance of monetary policy came about.
Strong keynesian-type refJation packages were looked upon to be
counterproductive. Thus a more moderate expansion policy was
pursued in 1976.
2. On average the economic development under the new economic
policy environment has up to now not brought about the desired
results: Growth rates are in general still far below the rates
achieved in the fifties and sixties; unemployment widened substant-
ially and remained high; inflation rates in many cases remained
double-digit; disequilibria in foreign balances became even more
severe. These failures, however, should not be attributed to the
'new policy' . Market economies do react with a time-lag. A 'new-8-
policy' requires even a longer time to translate into economic
action. The very fact, that those countries which engaged in
1975/1976 in an old-fashioned keynesian-type reflation policy are
worst off in terms of unemployment, inflation and external dis-
equilibria, indicates, that anticyclical devices not even in the
short run do show better results.
3. Before deciding to reintroduce anticyclical demand management,
one should therefore recognize that the socio-political pre-conditions
for such an economic policy have expired in the sixties: Money
illusion largely disappeared. However, actual policy action during
the last years should be examined. If the failure of the 1974/1975
recession is due to mistakes of the management of the stabilization
policy, these mistakes should be avoided.
4. The roots of the economic difficulties in the mid-seventies are to
be found in the late effects of the last strong anticyclical effort of
most governments in the early seventies. In 1971 and 1972 monetary
expansion was overheated, its effects artificially cooled down by
wage- and price controls and its internationalization hindered by
capital controls. These tensions led to an explosion in 1973: Prices
shot up, and the fixed exchange rate system collapsed; the national
authorities regained autonomy for economic policy.
5. After the Dollar- devaluation in early 197 3 and the introduction of
a free float of European currencies against the Dollar, some European
central banks, especially the German and the Swiss central bank, v
misused the autonomy they had gained from the float: they decreased
the money stock for a rather extended period. Because of the curren-
cy snake, the partner countries were to some extent forced to follow
the Bundesbank's over-restrictive efforts.-9-
6. This unannounced, abrupt monetary deceleration came into
collision with an inflationary development fuelled by past expans-
ionary policy, by decontrol of prices and wages and - on top of
all that - by a quadrupling of the oil price. Under those circum-
stances a slowdown of real economic activity was unavoidable.
The very fact that wages react only with a lag to real and to price
developments explains the rest of the dramatic nosedive of European
economies in late 1974 and 1975.
7. Obviously, neither unions and employers nor governments (nor
their economists) understood that the deterioration of the terms
of trade had to be translated into lower increases - or even decreases
of all national real incomes. Since wage policy did not take account
of that fact in 1974 and 1975, the cutback of incomes concentrated on
profits, paving the way to a decline of investment, the increase of
bankruptcies and to a cumulative deceleration of production and
employment. The downturn was moderated in 1974 by a substantial
increase of exports to OPEC- and Comecon-countries. In 1975 inter-
national trade reinforced the recessionary development-in OECD-
countries.
II. Impediments for a Rapid Recovery
8. In classical theory a recession is looked upon as a means to clear
up misbalances: structural changes come about, inflation disappears,
relative prices are shifted to anew equilibrium, thus generating the
conditions to reach again full employment and to promote growth.
Obviously, during the last recession a lot of obstacles prevented
these results. Adjustments often were delayed. Therefore at the
trough of recession in early 1975, none of the consequences of a
classical recession had been achieved: inflation rates still were
double-digit in most countries, real wages were out of step with-lO-
re al development, thus squeezing profits and creating unemploy-
ment; precautionary investment decisions delayed the necessary
structural changes.
9. On top of that, economic policy - at least in 1976 - was not con-
ceived in the typical 'go-fashion' as entrepreneurs and unions were
used to in recessionary periods in the sixties or the early seventies.
High international and domestic indebtedness limited the inclination
of governments to intensify their expansionary efforts. But not only
constraints from this side led to a less expansionary course. Still
high inflation rates and the belief that fiscal and monetary stimulation
would be easily transmitted into a renewed inflationary spiral even in
a situation of underutilized capacities brought about a tendency for
trendoriented and less anticyclical monetary and fiscal policy.
10. Being conscious of all these difficulties to stimulate real activity
without reaccelerating inflation, monetary expansion in important
countries is moderate and geared to money supply targets, which
are changed only gradually and - in some cases - after being pr'e-
announced. Fiscal policy is conceived to solve two problems:
consolidating the budget (as to volume of deficit and as to structure
of expenditures) and at the same time to avoid negative effects on
total demand. In many countries incomes policy complements the
efforts to increase economic activity by changing inflation expect-
ations in line with changing demand management policies, i.e. to
diminish the downward rigidities of wages and prices.
III. The Shape of the Recovery
a) The Profile of Output
11. In spring 1977, the recovery in industrial countries which has been
under way for roughly six quarters can be qualified as of moderate
character. It has by no means developed in a steady fashion: after a-11-
fulminating start in late 1975, the recovery stranded in a summer
lull in 1976 almost everywhere. Obviously some countries are out
of these duldrums and back on their upward trend since late 1976,
as indicated by the increase of industrial production (Figure A 1).
12. The present recovery does not differ so much from previous
recoveries in terms of rates of increase. The main difference is
the level from which it started. In most countries the 1974/1975
recession brought about record levels of underutilization of capacity.
Thus even six quarters of substantial increase of industrial product-
ion and GNP did not bring back 'normal' utilization levels. It should,
however, be mentioned that due to the rapid structural changes
during the first half of the seventies, some part of the existing
physical capacity may be economically obsolete. Consequently, the
factual utilization rates are not as low as statistically indicated.
Only around year-end 1976 industrial production reached again pre-
recession levels. As GNP increased since summer 1976 on average
only at the growth rate of the potential, no substantial progress as
to utilization of physical capacity could be achieved; unemployment
even tended to increase in some countries.
13. Several times since the beginning of the recovery it was expected
that the economic development in industrial countries would again
dissociate. Countries with structural current balance deficits were
expected to lag behind the other countries in the course of the cycle
in order to solve their foreign balance problems by an export-led
recovery. This hope failed to materialize several times. In nearly
all countries the recovery started at the same time, namely mid-1975.
While it was less pronounced in Great Britain and Switzerland, it did
not occur at all in Sweden. Most countries experienced the 'summer
pause' 1976.-12-
Figure A 1
INDUSTRIEPRODUKTION UND SOZIALPRODUKTIN WICHTIGEN
LANDERN
a 1973-1976°
Industrial production and real GNP in six major countries 1974 -1976°




































































Index der Industrieproduktion - Index of industrial production
[I Reales Sozialprodukt (Verdnderung gegenuber dem Vorquartal) - Real GNP; %changes from previous quarter
Saisonbereinigt - Seasonally adjusted.
Gleitende Dreimonatsdurchschnitte.- fur die letzten Monate wurde auch der ungeglattete Wert eingezeichnet.
Three-month moving averages,- for recent months the unsmoothed values are shown too.-13-
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After having announced and introduced measures to dampen inflation,
many European countries, especially Italy, Great Britain, France
and Denmark, were expected to have a slowdown of production during
winter 1976/1977. However, in late 1976 practically all countries
moved in upward direction after the protracted summer lull, as
indicated by industrial production and quarterly GNP-data. Again,
contrary to expectations, Italy experienced the steepest increase.
14. On the whole, 1976 proved to be a better year than expected by most
forecasters. GNP increased on average by more than 5 percent in
OECD-countries and by 4 percent in Western Europe. However,
while a 6 percent GNP increase in the United States implies a 3
percent increase of capacity utilization, the 4 percent rate for Europe
means stagnation of capacity utilization. In Europe only West Germany,
Norway, and to a smaller degree Italy have achieved.a substantial
increase of capacity utilization during the recovery.
b) Demand Mix During the Recovery
15. In most cases the recovery was consumption-led and reinforced by
a turnaround in inventories. This is not too surprising in the light
of wage developments, postponed purchases of durable consumer
goods after the oil-shock in 197 3/1974 and the various efforts of
governments to stimulate private consumption by fiscal measures.
Lowering interest rates for consumer credits complemented these
efforts. After a slowdown of consumption and the end of the first
phase of the turnaround in inventories during summer 197 6, the re-
newed increase of economic activity around year-end 1976 coincided
in most countries with a reappearance of an upward trend of private
consumption.
16. Investment remained weak during the first six quarters of the
recovery. During previous cycles, investment had already increased-15-
at substantial rates at this stage of the cycle. In some countries,
however, investment in producer durables experienced an early
pick up, mostly due to fiscal stimulation (West Germany, Austria,
France, United States).
While GNP-developments are rather similar in most OECD-countries,
the profile of investment differs substantially. Most striking is the
sluggishness of investment in Japan. The United Kingdom, and many
: other of the smaller European countries still experience stagnating
or even declining investment expenditures. This, however, has not
only a delaying effect on the upswing, but also a negative impact on
the longterm growth of the production potential.
17. The least favourable development - with the exception of the United
States - can be observed for construction. On average it reached its
trough in 1976; in some countries it is still declining in absolute
terms. This reflects not only a cyclical slowdown but also a reaction
to the inflation-induced construction boom of the early seventies.
Still high longterm interests rates in many countries (Italy, France,
United Kingdom, several smaller countries) and low confidence in
future income gains explain the hesitancy to invest into real assets
and especially into construction.
The performance of various sectors of construction differs sub-
stantially. Some government simulation programs helped temporari-
ly, especially to stimulate activity in non- residential construction.
In some countries (Germany, Japan) single family houses developed
quite favourably, thus avoiding even more sluggishness of construct-
ion. In most countries public construction demand is rather weak
often contributing considerably to the downward tendencies for total
construction.
18. Due to the development of private consumption and especially the
demand for durables, the first industry experiencing an upward trend-16-
in most European countries was the consumer goods industry. This
did not hold true for the United Kingdom, where real wages develop-
ed rather sluggishly in 1975. The next sector which experienced an
upward development was the base material and production goods
industry (Figure A 2).
19. Within each of the main groups of industries, however, the develop-
ment was by no means homogeneous. The automobile industry, the
early starter into the revovery, has continued to be one of the central
upswing forces in countries - except in the United Kingdom - with
important automobile industries. The chemical industry was another
sector favourably affected. Its recovery was intensified by the
inventory cycle.
While steel industry partly recovered - with the exception of West
Germany - engineering remained sluggish in all countries until late
1976. During the winter there are first clear signs for a stronger
upward trend in the United States and Germany, indicating that the
second stage of the recovery may be entered at least in these coun-
tries. Still worse off is the shipbuilding industry in Europe, not only
suffering from a breakdown of demand but also from increased
competition of Japanese firms.
c) Labour Market Developments
20. While in practically all OECD-countries production - though at a
different pace - has increased, labour market developments differ
to a great extent. Whereas in the United States the pick up of the
cycle coincides with the turnaround at the labour market, and in
West Germany unemployment remained unchanged after some im-
provement in the first half of 197 6, most other countries experienced
a continuing rise of unemployment figures until recently. Develop-
ments during last months seem to indicate that the end of the
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21. The reason for the weak labour market development is basically
to be seen in the fact, that in most European countries the cutback
of production in 1974/1975 did not lead to an equivalent reduction
of employment. Thus production increases in 1975/1976 could be
matched with the existent labour force and by re-instituting
'average' overtime. An increasing labour force - due to demograph-
ic developments - intensified labour market problems, especially in
West Germany, Italy and France.
22. Analyzing national unemployment figures partly disguises the
differences of labour market problems. In Europe the re-emigration
of labour helps countries like Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and
France to keep their unemployment figures down, whereas it com-
plicates the problems of Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, Portugal,
and Turkey. A second factor, not showing up in unemployment
figures is short-time working. This was an important instrument to
avoid 'registered' unemployment. It has been and still is of major
importance in Italy and Germany.
d) The Course of Prices and Wages
2 3. Despite the fa ct that in most countries inflation rates have been
falling for almost two and a half years, the year-over-year increase
of consumer prices in OECD-countries is still near 7 percent, in
Western Europe almost 10 percent. Monetary deceleration in 197 3/
1974 and subsequent recession finally have had their lagged effects
on wages and prices. While raw material prices, especially for non-
industrial products, after a marked slow-down in 1975, have in-
creased already in 1976 - though at a modest pace - and continue to
do so in winter 1976/1977, industrial producer prices after a short
acceleration period in early 1976 continue to increase only at low
rates (Figure A 4).-21-
Figure A 4
GROSSHANDELS- UND VERBRAUCHERPREISE IN AUSGEWAHLTEN
LANDERN
Wholesale and Consumer Prices in Selected Countries
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^Saisonbereinigt, auf Jahresbasis - Seasonally adjusted, annual rates.
Dlndustrielte Erzeugerpreise. - Producer prices.
^Halbfabrikate. - Semi- manufactured goods.
Q Jeweils Land mit dem starksten Preisanstieg. - Highest inflationrate experienced at times in one of the countries.
eJeweils Land mit dem geringsten Preisanstieg. - Lowest inflationrate experienced at times in one of the countries.-22-
24. Describing the average inflation performance of industrial countries
does not mean very much: divergencies not only as to magnitude of
inflation rates, but also as to directions can be observed. While on
the one hand Italy and the United Kingdom - countries with the
highest inflation rates - experience a renewed acceleration of in-
flation with current annual rates in winter 1976/1977 beyond 20 per-
cent, countries like Switzerland, Germany and the United States on
the other hand continue to hold down inflation rates successfully be-
tween one to five percent.
25. In 197 6 increasing inflation rate discrepancies coincided with drastic
exchange rate changes in 1976. In the deficit countries sharp de-
valuations were accompanied by strong increases of import prices,
whereas revaluations induced low import price increases or even
falling import prices in surplus countries. However, this is no
reason to blame exchange rate movements for inflation divergencies.
The basic reason for those discrepancies is the substantial differ-
ence in growth rates of the money supply from country to country.
Exchange rate changes, which anticipate these lagged effects of
monetary policy, speed up the transmission process from monetary
impulses to price increases. During 1976 markets obviously became
more aware of the relevance of divergencies in monetary policy,
thus promoting rather drastic exchange rate changes.
26. The persistent existence of large inflation rate differentials, however,
could not be explained without historically determined different
socio-political preconditions as the basis for the reactions of wage
settlements to external shocks and internal policy changes. Many
countries have adopted an indexed wage-system (Italy, Belgium,
Denmark, Netherlands). Adjusting wages to the development of
prices has no negative employment effects nor inflationary conse-
quences, if the change of real wages is oriented at 'real' develop--23-
ments. (i. e. productivity, terms of trade, shift from private to
public sector). In any case, in the medium run inflationary con-
sequences of wage indexation are only possible, if the central bank
pursues an accomodating monetary policy.
e) Exchange Rates and Balance of Payments
27. In 1975, the improvement of the current balances of deficit countries
led to a calming-down of foreign exchange markets. When during
the recovery in 1976 current deficits increased again, drastic de-
valuations took place. Most striking was the rapid fall of the Lira.
The British Pound and French Franc - the latter after again having
left the snake - were the other important currencies with a sub-
stantial devaluation. The D-Mark, the Swiss Franc, the Yen and
- only until mid-1976 - the US-Dollar experienced a rather strong
appreciation (Figure A 5).
28. The willingness of the deficit-countries to dampen the inflationary
process by restrictive measures and the readiness of strong coun-
tries to give credits - motivated by the desire to hold up the own
exports, an inclination increased by the meagre advances of the
recovery - resulted in a big round of international credit arrange-
ments. The most important ones were those for the United Kingdom.
Deflationary measures and international credits brought about a
calming down of foreign exchange markets: The Pound even appreciat-
ed recently, while - oddly enough - the Swiss Franc depreciated for
several months.
29. The worsening of trade and current balance in 1976 was most pro-
nounced in the United States. The trade balance development, how-
ever, should be interpreted mainly as a reflex of the cyclical lead
of the United States. The worsening - and this should be recognized -
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Eigene Berechnungen - Own calculations.-25-
The worsening of the US-balance was obviously not to the advantage
of most western European countries. Their structural deficiencies
led to increasing deficits often via a strong deterioration of their terms
of trade (i. e. in France, Denmark, Austria, Italy, and the United
Kingdom). The improvement of trade balance and current balance of
Japan is mainly due to a slow recovery and the export mindedness of
Japanese firms. Germany, despite experiencing a rather strong increase
of imports has experienced only a small worsening of its trade and
current balance. Obviously the favourable product mix of German ex-
ports outweighed the effects of the earlier revaluations of the
D-Mark (Figures A 6 and 7).
IV. The Short-term Outlook
30. Presently two scenarios are competing at the forecasting ' markets' .
The optimistic alternative is a continued - though modest - re-
covery in 1977, including the expectation that private investment
will increase. The pessimistic alternative is a new period of stagna-
tion, including increasing unemployment and no pick up of invest-
ment. While the first alternative is shared by the majority of econo-
mic institutes and some private forecasting firms, the latter is
favoured by the OECD.
The developments in recent months, which were quite favourable
in most countries tend to support the optimistic version of the out-
look. The developments caused several institutions to refrain from
repeating their rather gloomy forecasts given around year-end
1976.
a) The Socio-economic Framework
31. Some of the 1976 economic difficulties are attributable to political
problems. Four big countries were temporarily not fully capable
to cope with economic problems due to general elections: Italy,
West Germany, Japan, and the United States. Since no new cumula--26-
Figure A 6
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tion of general elections will take place in 1977, one obstacle
to a steady economic development does not exist. However, the
1978 election in France, the fragile majority of the Labour
Government in Great Britain, a weak government in Italy and
the dismission of the Belgian and Netherlands Governments may
cause difficulties.
32. While political events in 197 7 are in general expected at least
to be not more disturbing than in 197 6, the continuing or even
increasing problem of unemployment and consequently the
necessity for low increases or even continuing decrease of
real wages may induce unrest with employees and unions: the
problem is less dramatic in so-called ' consensus countries',
i. e. where concerted efforts of government, unions and em-
ployers associations exist (West Germany, Austria). In countries,
where unions are not only associations of employees, but also
feel as the only powerful political opposition, the continuing
necessity to behave cooperative with government policy in order
to strengthen investment by favouring profits, may no longer
be accepted by unions. This may be especially true for the
deficit countries United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, where
workers have already experienced a marked decline of real
incomes. A renewed fight on the income distribution would,
however, be to the disadvantage of all groups.
33. Many countries are engaged in some sort of statutory incomes
policy. In the past most of the efforts in incomes policy in the
context of an old-fashioned economic policy proved to be un-
successful. Since mid-1976, however, it can be observed that
in nearly all countries incomes policy - to hold down wage- and
price increases - is not used as a substitute for a cautious
demand management policy. Instead, it represents the comple--30-
mentary price and wage (downward-)flexibility to the efforts
to slow down monetary overexpansion and the budget deficits,
in order to avoid contractionary effects.
34. Since the economic summit at Puerto Rico and enforced since
the IMF conference in Manila, international efforts have in-
creased not to allow for an inflationary go-policy. Consequent-
ly, the deficit countries which ask for international credits from
the IMF and other international lenders in order to avoid sharp
depreciations of their own currency increasingly have to accept
certain obligations concerning a moderation of economic policy.
35. Since mid-1976 most countries experience a slow-down of
monetary expansion. Since it means in most cases a
' normalization' of expansionary efforts, it is desirable for
stability- and for external equilibria-reasons. The very fact,
however, that all countries slow down monetary expansion at the
same time - and sometimes may overdo it - could endanger
the still fragile recovery in industrial countries.
36. This danger is reduced, since most of the so-called strong
countries have announced or released new fiscal stimuli since
winter. These policies are to a large extent not only increasing
demand temporarily, but include medium-term programs for
public investment and a permanent tax reduction, i. e. a sub-
sidization of private iniative (to work, to invest).
37. Up to now only the United States' monetary policy succeeded
in pursuing a monetary course, which can be qualified as a
steady stabilization-oriented course. Monetary policy in many
countries - Germany, Japan, and Switzerland included - failed
to consequently achieve a steady money supply expansion. How-
ever, after having made policy mistakes, governments and-31-
central banks tried to correct them in the course of 1976.
In general, it is assumed that despite a zig-zag-course of
economic policy through 197 6, its effects will finally and on
average be neither too restrictive nor too expansionary. In some
cases, where deflationary measures to stabilize the exchange rate
were undertaken during the second half of 1976, economic policy
may be qualified as overrestrictive, thus preparing ground for
a temporary slow-down of economic activity.
b) Outlook for Output in 1977
38. On average industrial countries expect a 4.5 percent increase of
GNP in 1977 after 5. 5. percent in 1976; the advance will be lower
for Western Europe (3. 5 percent). The majority of forecasts for
most countries - especially in Western Europe - imply a rate of
advance of GNP only as high as the growth rate of the potential,
thus leaving the capacity utilization as low as it was in 1976. The
1977 slowdown of expansion will be the consequence of a modera-
tion of government and central bank stimulation in 197 6 and early
1977 (Table A 1).
39. Forecasts for 1977 differ substantially not only from country to
country but also from forecaster to forecaster. In order to illustrate
the uncertainty about 197 7 the range of forecasts for the most
important countries are assembled in table A 2. The spread of
forecasts is as big as in 1976 (Table A 2).
The range of forecasts should become smaller as complete informa-
tion about 1976 becomes more and more available for all countries
and as current information for 1977 comes in at least for some
of the major economies. Since the last quarter of 1976 proved to
show the expected recovery from the summer lull in many industrial
countries, and since ' problem countries' like Italy, the United-32-
Table A 1 - GNP Development in Industrial Countries




























































































































Kingdom and France did - economically - better than expected,
it is assumed that the general economic development will be
more favourable than shown in table A 2.
40. Again it is believed that the United States, Japan and West Germany
will be the engines of the world economy. While the United States
and West Germany are expected to realize a 5 percent growth,
Japan is expected to have a GNP-increase of 5. 5 percent. While
these rates mean an ongoing substantial increase of capacity
utilization in the United States and West Germany, it implies on
average for 1977 only a constant capacity utilization for Japan.
41. GNP increases for Western Europe are forecast on average below
the growth rates of the production potential, thus increasing idle
capacities and unemployment. While those countries, which are
closely connected to West Germany are expected to experience
a relatively good performance, the development in Italy, France,
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden is believed to be less
favourable.
If one analyzes which current developments are implied in the above
mentioned year-over-year figures, it is obvious that the forecasters
must have assumed zero-growth in the course of 1977, for example
for Italy, Great Britain and Denmark. The carry-over at the end
of 197 6 was high enough to bring about the year-over-year advances
shown in table A 1. In light of the development during recent months
this assumption,however, seems to be overpessimistic. On the
contrary, in some of the latter mentioned countries, the rate of
increase of production will accelerate in the course of 1977.
42. Comparing the latest forecasts for 1977 with those made by A I E C E
members in autumn 197 6, a small downward revision can be ob-
served. While it is due to a shortfall of the 197 6 performance in
the case of West Germany and the United States, it may be a-35-
consequence of the assumption that restrictive measures in
Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark and France make for a
less favourable profile of the development in 1977.
c) Demand Mix in 1977
4 3. The driving forces of the ongoing recovery in the United States,
Japan, and West Germany will be - as a year ago - private con-
sumption and - more pronounced - investment. However, the
rates of increase of investment will be modest compared to
previous cycles. While in the United States and Japan construction
will stimulate activity, it will remain a retarding element for
the recovery in West Germany.
In most Western European countries the GNP increase is fore-
cast to stem from a rather good export performance, a moderate
consumption increase and slowly increasing government ex-
penditures. With the exception of West Germany, investment
will be a retarding element for all European countries. Thus
most European countries are predicted to rely mainly on an
export-led recovery. Since only the United States and Japan are
forecast to have a substantially higher increase in imports com-
pared to exports, the forecast strong improvement of the trade
balance of Europe requires an additional compensation outside
the OECD-countries: whether a worsening of the trade balance
of OPEC-, LDC- and/or Comecon-countries can match it, is at
least an open question.
Two alternative scenarios may be therefore as probable as the
above mentioned: either Europe' s imports increase at a faster
rate than forecast by AIECE members, or Europe' s export
advances are below the forecast given in table A 3.
d) Inflation Forecast
44. In general low capacity utilization and a rather moderateTable A 3 - Development of GNP and Its Components for Industrial Countries
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monetary expansion in most countries should prepare ground for
another period of declining inflation rates in 1977. However, cost
push from various sides may emerge in 1977 - for example via an
increase of wages or raw material prices or by an increase of
administered prices or even sales taxes. A reacceleration of
inflation may be fortified if at the London economic summit on
May 7/8 new strong reflation programs will be propagated, which
imply easy money policy.
45. Despite a moderation of current inflation rates in "high-inflation
countries" and high probability for no further stabilization progress
in "low-inflation countries", the inflation divergencies between
countries will remain rather high. While Switzerland will be again
on the low side with a consumer price increase (year-over-year)
as low as 1. 5 percent, Italy will remain to be the most inflationary
economy with a year-over-year increase of consumer prices of near-
ly 20 percent. It should be mentioned, however, that these year-over-
year figures imply a substantial deceleration of inflation in "high-
inflation countries" and constant inflation rates in so-called "low-
inflation countries". It is assumed that the remaining inflation
differentials will have to be matched by changes of the nominal ex-
change rates. Otherwise the competitive position would deteriorate
and an export-led growth for the inflation-prone deficit countries
would not be probable (Table A 4).
e) Labour Market Tendencies
46. The labour market forecast for most European countries is rather
gloomy. The expected increase of GNP will only be on average 3. 5
percent, leaving capacity utilization rates practically unchanged.
Therefore, it is not probable that employment will increase at all
in the course of 1977; this is the more true, since short-time work
has not yet disappeared and the average work time is not back to-38-
Table A 4 - Price Development in Industrial Countries



















































































































normal levels. As an increase of the labour force can be expected,
unemployment will continue to increase, though not at substantial
rates. The exception will be West Germany and Austria, where the
comparably strong recovery will bring about a further reduction of
unemployment. The United States will also experience a lowering
of unemployment rates.
47. In addition to the cyclical problems of the labour market, there
are - with differences from country to country - intensifying struc-
tural difficulties: increasing unemployment rates of young people
and women - also due to higher than average increases of the labour
force - are likely to emerge. Also, the lack of flexibility of wage
levels and the wage structure on the one hand and the relatively small
regional and vocational mobility of workers on the other prevent a
faster adjustment to the structural changes in the economies. On top
of that, the existing jobs became obsolete during the last recession.
Thus even if demand increases, unemployment will not disappear,
since, first of all, new job opportunities have to be created, i. e.
investment has to take place.
f) Balance of Payments Outlook
48. The forecast of AIECE members as well as the OECD include a
substantial improvement of the deficit countries' trade balance
and the current balance in 197 7. The positive swing for Western
Europe is expected to stem mainly from a decline of the deficits of
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Denmark, while the sur-
pluses of Germany and the Netherlands remain practically un-
changed. This improvement is forecast to find its counterpart in
a further deterioration of the US-balance and a worsening of the
Japanese balance. Additionally, a decreasing surplus of the OPEC-
countries is expected.-40-
49. However, with the exception of a worsening of the US-balance,
the process of changing the trade and current balance disequilibria
still has not yet shown up clearly in the statistics. Until recently
neither a worsening of the Japanese balance nor an improvement
of the EEC balance has been observed. An obstacle for a durable
improvement of the trade balance may be the attempt to stop the
depreciation of Lira and Pound and some other European currencies,
thus endangering international price competitiveness of these countries.
Therefore, one should be prepared for either a revision of the balance
of payments outlook towards a smaller improvement of the EEC
current balance, or - as it is assumed more probable - for a further
depreciation of most european currencies.
50. While it seems possible to have two really different scenarios
for 1977, it does not seem to make sense to forecast a recession
in 1978. Either the optimists are right for 1977, and investment
will pick up in the engine countries. In this case, 197 8 will be the
third year of the recovery and the investment cycle should get
momentum. Or the pessimists are right for 1977, and stagnation
is developing in the course of the year. In this case governments
and central banks would step in. Those stimulation programs would
have their impact only in 1978, thus again restarting the interrupted
recovery.-41-
B. The Unemployment Problem - Causes and Cures
1. The current recovery in the industrialized countries has not yet
led to a substantial increase of employment. Unemployment
figures are still high - in some cases rising - even after a year
since the trough of the recession. On the top of this very un-
satisfactory picture of the present: hardly any forecasts for the
coming years include a reduction of unemployment rates close
to those experienced in the 196O's In fact, other than cyclical
- namely structural - factors are made responsible for a large
part of the problem, which allow only for a very gradual reduct-
ion of the unemployment rates.
2. Various measures to solve the problems are discussed, planned
or have already been taken. However, not all of them promise
to be successful either in achieving the goal of higher employment
and/or in avoiding negative impacts on other targets of economic
policy.
I The Present Situation
3. In most of the OECD-countries, the rates of unemployment in the
last recession have been much higher than during previous re-
cessions. Table B 1 shows a large increase of unemployment
during the 70' s (up to four times the level of the average of the
60' s for the case of Germany and the Netherlands). This sub-
stantial increase - besides structural factors - very much re-
flects the depth of the 1974/75 recession.
a) Slowly Declining Unemployment
4. In most of the countries mentioned here, the increase of unemploy-
























































































































































Source: OECD, ILO, national statistics.-43-
only in a few countries has there been a significant turnaround:
a reduction of unemployment has been observed in the United
States, Germany and Austria, while the levels have roughly re-
mained at their maximum in the other countries, also due to
the general slowdown in the speed of the recovery after spring of
last year. While the development in Italy does not really show
a 'typical' cyclical pattern (due to institutional and statistical
problems), it is worth mentioning, that Sweden experienced no
substantial increase of unemployment at all, in spite of the re-
cession. This may largely be attributed to the subsidies to firms
in order to hold up their work force.
5. The comparison with two earlier business cycles shows - with
very few exceptions - the following characteristics for the ten
countries (Figure B 1):
- the 1974/7 5 recession brought about the largest increase of un-
employment;
- whilethe development had not been much different in the down-
swing period, the duration of high or even increasing unem-
ployment levels is relatively long (extreme cases are Belgium,
Japan and the United Kingdom);
- there has - with the exception of Austria - not been a turnaround
almost as fast as in earlier cycles, though the production gains
have generally not been less than during former recovery periods.
6. The last two points suggest that up to now there have been large
reserves of productivity. One factor explaining this phenomenon
is short-time work, which had not been instituted to this extent
in former recessions. In Italy, for example, more than two per-
For the present cycle, the latest data cover mostly the fourth,
sometimesthe third quarter of 1976.-44-
Figure B 1











































f/ie scales art inverted.
b
The calculations are based on quarterly
OECD-data of seasonally adjusted
figures of unemployment.
The different lines show the development
of unemployment eight quarters before
and after each trough, which is defined
as the largest downward deviation of in-
dustrial production from the long-term trend
I continued on next page)
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The number of persons unemployed in each
trough-quarter has the index value 100.
Each line is denoted with the year and
quarter of the corresponding trough (for
example Germany: 19631.19671 and 1975U).
If. W.Kiel-46-
cent of the persons employed were actually working short-time
during 1975 and 1976; and in Germany, the number of short-time
workers at time reached more thai 75 percent of the unemployment
level. This new phenomenon of sharing costs between employers
and the government (or social insurance agencies) therefore had
a dual impact on the unemployment situation: on the one hand,
during the downswing, unemployment did not increase as much
as could have been expected from the unusually sharp reduction
of production. On the other hand, however, the recovery affected
the labourmarket primarily through a reduction of short-time work
rather than of unemployment.
Another factor preventing a faster reduction of unemployment was
the normalization of the average work-time, including an extension
of overtime, which had been very much reduced during the recession.
Therefore, the increase of production was not reflected in a decrease
of unemployment figures but rather in higher utilization of the labour
force on the job.
7. It is also likely that the attitude of employers to hiring new workers
has changed. Because of lacking security about the future course of
economic policy on the one hand or because of the "new approach"
of economic policy towards a more moderate expansion on the other,
uncertainty about the development of demand and production existed.
Also, in recent years it has been made more difficult for employers
to dismiss workers by more regulations. In Italy, for example, they
have to pay subsidies to those they have dismissed, so that it is very
costly to reduce the work force. Therefore, they are more cautious
in hiring new workers and prefer instituting additional overtime in
order to increase production. This was even more the case, because
wage increases were - generally - still high.-47-
8. A factor concealing the size of unemployment to some extent is the
fact, that in some countries (Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland)
a large number of foreign workers returned to their home countries,
mostly because their contracts were not renewed. Not only governments
but also unions promoted this tendency in order to 'protect' domestic
workers. However, this increases the unemployment problem of other
- mainly southern European - countries.
b) Turnaround of Employment in Most Countries
9. A better indicator for the current recovery is the development of
employment figures, because there are large differences between the
countries' labour force developments. While in some European
countries the number of persons in the labour force practically
stagnated, the large gains of employment in the United States (total
employment is about 6 percent higher than in the depth of the recession)
were accompanied by a similar increase of the labour force, so that
the decline of unemployment was much smaller.
10. A cyclical comparison is performed for the ten countries with respect
to the important component of employment in industry or manufact-
uring (Figure B 2). The comparison reflects, on the one hand,
structural changes in most industrialized countries: while the recession
in the fifties and sixties - even severe ones - were characterized by
only short-term interruptions of the upward trend of employment in
industry (the extreme case is Japan), the more recent development
shows that this trend has stopped or at least slowed down, partly due
to the declining contribution of the industrial sector to the gross
national product. This should dampen the expectation of an increase
of employment in this sector.
11. The present situation is characterized by an increase of employment
in most countries with the exception of the Netherlands (stagnation),-48-
Figure B 2
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Sweden and Japan (still decrasing). Considering that industrial
production has just about reached pre-recession levels in most
countries and that productivity reserves had still been very high,
one could not expect a fast increase of employment until now.
II. Causes of Unemployment
12. Most of the problems of unemployment is due to the coincidence of
the following phenomena during the early seventies:
- the acceleration of inflation and the adjustment problems after the
unexpectedly crude stabilization policies;
- the increasing need for structural changes in most industrialized
countries - also due to drastic exchange rate changes after the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the quadrupling of the
oil price;
- the increasing tendency towards regulations on the labour market,
causing a decline of the efficiency of the market mechanism.
Since these factors are very complex and since they are linked together,
it is impossible to quantitatively attribute parts of the present un-
employment to each of the causes.
a) Cyclical Causes of Unemployment
13. The acceleration of inflation in the early 1970's was brought about
by a policy mainly designed to keep up or increase the level of
employment: in most industrialized countries, expansionary fiscal
policy was combined with easy monetary policy. This proved to be
successful, as long as inflation rates were not fully anticipated.
Wage contracts thus included - though not intentionally - a lag of real
wages behind productivity gains, so that an increase of employment
was possible. But since inflation continuously accelerated, it caused-51-
a fundamental change: money illusion vanished, inflation became more
and more anticipated and therefore lost its stimulating effects.
The reversed effects occurred when monetary policy became restric-
tive in order to reduce the rates of inflation. Unannounced and/or
not anticipated policy-changes brought about unintended gains in real
wages since actual inflation fell short of expected rates. Consequent-
ly, increases of real wages were not compatible with the increases
of productivity.
14. On top of this came the 'oil shock' in 1973, or one should rather say,
the reaction of economic policy towards the price increase through
the OPEC-countries. The increase of the relative price of oil should
have been implemented in the wage contracts: because of the deterior-
ation of the terms of trade of industrialized countries, a lower
increase or a higher decline of real wages was necessary so that
the unavoidable decline in real income was not mainly passed on
profits. However, some countries continued for a while in pursuing
an inflationary policy, bringing about a reduction of real wages this
way.
In other countries - like Germany -, where monetary policy had
already been designed to reduce the rates of inflation, real wages
increased relative to productivity because of too high inflation
expectations. This led to a decline of profits and a large amount of
unemployment. Thus, the oil price increase indirectly intensified
the ' stabilization crisis' , which can basically be attributed to the
failure of monetary authorities to announce reliable targets for the
growth of the money supply compatible with a reduction of inflation
rates and/or the failure of employers and unions to acknowledge such
signals when wage contracts were negotiated, and to understand the
very meaning of the 'oil shock' .-52-
b) Structural Elements of Unemployment
15. A significant part of the present unemployment is attributed to
structural - that is other than cyclical ••• factors. This means that
there will not be enough jobs available to allow for full employment
even at full utilization of the existing capital stock.
16. There is a very broad discussion about this factor of unemployment,
especially in West Germany, and it is also very controversial, because
it is possible theoretically to differentiate whether unemployment
is of cyclical or structural nature, however, empirical tests are
very difficult. In a recent survey, the IFO-institute, for example,
stated that the number of the presently existing jobs would allow almost
all of the unemployed to work again, if the overall level of demand
would increase sufficiently. A completely different result is given by
the 'Sachverstandigenrat' : they estimated a sizable gap of almost
one million (about 3 1/2 percent) between the potential labour force
and the number of available jobs. Further, this expert council
estimated the loss of jobs since 1973 to 800, 000.
17. The hypothesis of ' structural' unemployment is based on the fact,
that countries with a long lasting undervaluation of their currency
- this is especially the case for Germany - suddenly had to face
stronger competition after the rapid exchange rate movements since
the end of the 1960's. Some industries, which had profited from the
false exchange rate, were now outcompeted, and the jobs in these
branches became obsolete.
Another factor - and this concerns most of the industrialized countries -
is the increased competition from less developed countries. Since
Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 1976/77: Zeit zum Investieren.
Stuttgart, Mainz, December 1976.-53-
the late 60's, they effectuated with growing success their comparative
advantage in the production of industrial goods, incorporating mainly
standardized production technology, and have increased their share
in world trade - in spite of some protectionist policies of industrial
countries. Consequently, there is need for more rapid structural
adjustments in the industrialized countries. If economic policy is
not conducive to structural changes, the jobs in the industries concerned
become obsolete without an equivalent increase of job in other areas
of the economy. This increases the component of structural unemploy-
ment.
c) Microeconomic Aspects of Unemployment
18. Within the labour force there are certain groups whose competitive
position (to be defined as nominal productivity in relation to wage-
costs) in the market is relatively low. Among these are mainly
persons with lower than average qualification levels. This is the case
mainly for women and young people. Though it can be observed in
most countries, there are large differences: in Italy, for example,
in 1975 the unemployment rate of young people under 2 5 years was
about four times as high as the average rate, in France about 2. 5
times, in Germany 1.5 times. These rates are even substantially
higher for the group under 20 years of age. For women, the
respective rates are roughly 1. 5 times the average unemployment
rate .
ca) Unemployment of Women
19. Part of the problem of female unemployment is concealed by the
fact that - in spite of an upward trend - there are large fluctuations
For the following description see also: R. Soltwedel, D. Spinanger,
Beschaftigungsprobleme in Industriestaaten (Forschungsauftrag
der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), Niirnberg 1976.-54-
of the participation rates of women. As the rate usually declines
in recessions, unemployment only increases at a lower rate, so that
the problem is incorrectly estimated. However, during recoveries
the participation rate increases once again, causing - at least in the
short-run - higher search unemployment, because of the relatively
long time for women to find a job. This is the case - during the
present recovery - notably in Germany arid Belgium, but also in
most other countries.
20. The relatively high medium-run unemployment rate for women may
be explained by several factors:
- because of the lack of mobility (dependence on children or on the
husband's job location) many women have to restrict their job
search activities to a limited area;
- many women prefer - due to the constraints mentioned above -
part-time jobs, the supply of which is very sensitive to cyclical
fluctuations;
- because women - on the average - have qualifications inferior to
those of men, they may get jobs with lower qualification standards,
which are usually the first ones hit by structural changes, for
example by rationalization efforts of firms;
- because the expected working life of women is relatively short and
often interrupted (for example by pregnancies or household
reasons), firms cannot be sure that investment in on-the-job
training will be compensated in the future by big enough returns.
The unemployment risk is even bigger because of the upward trend
of participation rates in recent years.
21. These factors would not necessarily have a negative influence on
the competitive position of women in the labour market, if the wage
structure had the necessary flexibility. This is not the case, however,-55-
because the attempts to equalize wages between men and women in
many countries - though they are to be seen under the desirable
intention of social equality - unfortunately endanger the employment
chances of women. In light of all these influences it is not
surprising that minimum wage laws and higher than average wage
increases for low wage groups lead to particularly high unemploy-
ment of female workers. This is evident in most industrial countries.
In France (where statistics about wages for equal qualification are
available) one could observe until 1965, that the labour market even
absorbed a higher-than-average increase of the female labour force.
This was a period when the gap between wages for men and women
increased. After 1968, however, the trend reversed: minimum wages
rose relative to average wages, resulting in an increase of the un-
employment rate of women.
In the United States, as another example, the unemployment risk of
white women increased: the large increase of the labour force of
this group was accompanied by a strong advance of income relative
to that of men.
cb) Youth Unemployment
22. Higher than average rates of unemployment for young people in
practically all countries is the evidence of the fact that they have a
relatively weak competitive position in the labour market. The main
reason for this is, that in the short-run the costs of vocational or
on-the-job training exceed by far the receipts of the firms resulting
from their work. This is due to a large extent by high training
standards set by the state on the one hand and by fixed minimum
' wage levels on the other.
The fact that job-relevant training actually does reduce the unemploy-
ment risk, can be illustrated by the fact that the unemployment
rates for young people without any vocational training (even with a-56-
relatively high level school-leaving-certificate) are substantially
higher than those of young people who have finished vocational schools.
For example, in France (according to a sample in 1972), the un-
employment rate for males under 25 years was 1. 6 times, of females
4.4 times the average rate for those, who had finished vocational
schools. For those without any training, the respective rates are
3. 9 and 6. 1 times the average rate of unemployment. In Germany
the respective unemployment rates were even below average for young
people with completed vocational training.
2 3. The problem of youth unemployment becomes more pronounced in
cyclical downturns - this was also the case in the 1974/75 recession -
when the propensity to invest in human capital declines parallel to
the investment in fixed capital. Unemployment rates of young people
rise in comparison to the average rate of unemployment .
24. In some countries, the employment problems of young people are
increased by still other interventions in the labour market, for
example by the protection of people already on the job or older workers.
This is especially true for Japan and Sweden, but also for Germany
and Italy. Further, minimum wage laws existing practically in all
countries, but very strictly pursued in the United States, mainly
reduce the demand for those workers with the lowest human capital
standards. In the United States, this is mainly the case for black
youths.
cc) Unemployment through Regulations
25. The problems of unemployment - described here for the groups of
women and of young people - suggest that the risk of unemployment
is generally increased by factors which are not resulting from
Except for the case that the labour force of young people declines
sharply, because they give up searching for a job (see, for example,
in the United States during the last recession).-57-
solutions of a competitive market, but rather introduced by collective
bargaining or government policy. These hindrances can be summar-
ized as follows:
- minimum wage laws affecting workers whose competitive position
is often rather weak (young, female, old, black, less educated,
immobile persons);
- market regulations like legal hindrances for (national and inter-
national) migration of labour, protection of specific groups already
having a job or general protection against firing (Japan, Sweden,
Germany, Italy);
- lack of flexibility of wages (low wage differentials between regions
of a country or sectors of the economy);
- social security system reducing efforts to actively seek a job and/or
enabling to search longer, because of lower opportunity costs of
being unemployed.
2 6. In general, the increasing number of such regulations over the past
years has contributed a great deal to the tendency of higher unemploy-
ment. Though these factors are always at work, they aggravate the
problem of unemployment in the case of large downturns of economic
activity. Only during an upswing period there is the 'wage drift'
creating the necessary differentials to some extent.
III. Cures of the Unemployment Problem
a) More Expansionary Policy to Speed up the Recovery?
27. One of the suggestions made to reduce unemployment rates is more
stimulation of economic activity through demand management. Because
For the following description see also: Wege zur Uberwindung der
Arbeitslosigkeit. Beitrage zu einer Vortragsveranstaltung des
Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft. Kiel, January 1977.-58-
of aiming at quick successes, the OECD, the Carter Administration
and unions (in Germany or other countries) advocate these policies
to be pursued again. But the experience of the beginning 70's showed
that this policy would only be effective - if at all - in the short-run.
As soon as expansionary fiscal policy combined with easy monetary
policy is translated by economic units into inflationary expectations,
this strategy has negative returns to scale, i. e. fighting acceleration
of inflation would soon be on the agenda, with all the risks and
negative consequences of a stabilization crisis experienced in the
course of the last recession.
b) Fewer Working Hours to Increase Employment?
28. In many countries there is an ongoing discussion whether the work
time should be reduced in order to absorb the people unemployed,
either through a reduction of the average weekly worktime or of
overtime or through an extension of vacation. Though the goal to in-
crease leisure time is part of wage contracts most of the time, this
measure has been introduced in Austria with the explicit aim to
reduce unemployment.
29. In order to avoid an increase in unit labour costs (which would have
a negative impact on employment), it would be necessary to reduce
real wages if the average working time is reduced. Whether people
are willing to exchange more free time for real income would have
to be subject of negotiations between unions and employees.
30. There is considerable doubt whether a reduction_of the average
workweek would actually result in a significant increase of employ-
ment since it might well be compensated for to large extentby an
incr^a_s_e_c^_pxjo.du£jivity_5r - if individual workers do not accept a
cut of real income - by an increase of overtime. Also, already at
present there is a lack of workers with special professional skills-59-
in some areas. This problem would even be aggravated, if the
average work time was reduced. Altogether, it may well be over-
estimated how many 'new jobs' will become available through such
a measure.
31. The long-term consequences of a strategy like this are even more
doubtful:
- because the imposed regulation of lower real wages does not
reduce unit labour costs. Because it does not increase investment
incentives of firms, it is not conducive to more long-term growth
of capacity potential and the creation of new jobs;
- because it would almost be impossible to increase the legal
working-hours again, if labour becomes scarce in the long-run;
this could become relevant in the 1980's, when the increase of
the labour force will slow down substantially after expiring of the
impact of the baby-boom.
A reduction of the working-hours - unless it is desired by employees
and unless it would really be compensated by more free time in
exchange for working-time - would be no solution of the unemploy-
ment-problem.
c) Subsidies for Employment?
32. Another measure suggested and already performed in a few countries
is a strategy following the''Swedish Model' of subsidies. The govern-
ment is paying marginal employment premiums to firms if they hold
up or increase their work force. This policy is supposed to raise
employment and at the same time reduce inflationary pressures for
mainly two reasons:
- there are negative marginal costs of hiring workers, so that unit
production costs are reduced;-60-
- the increase of the fiscal deficit is comparatively small, because
on the one hand the premiums paid are usually smaller than
unemployment insurance expenses, and on the other hand total tax
revenues are larger than they would be, if the people became un-
employed and did therefore not pay any taxes.
33. However, there are several objections to be made against this model:
- it would reduce the flexibi 1 i ty of real wages and therefore have a
negative impact on economic growth, because it hinders or at
least procrastinates necessary structural adjustments. There
would be less reason for firms to raise the productivity through,
for example, rationalization; J.
- unemployment in a sector or a firm can also be the result of in-
creased competition. The governnient_would have to commit itself
to_ke_eping up an indust£y_wjuch^j:s_n;oj.onger competitive in the
world market. This is, however, a kind of protectionist policy,
which would prevent imports from, for example, low-wage countries.
Thus, national employment would be increased at the cost of un-
employment somewhere else;
- it may imply substantial costs of administration.
d) The Case for Market Solutions
34. The three strategies described above imply: more regulations and
therefore more costs of bureaucracy; less mobility of workers
(regional and vocational); less flexibility of wages; less productivity;
more inflationary pressures; less incentives for structural adjustments.
These factors are likely to bring about lower long-term growth rates.
It illustrates that these policies of fighting unemployment cannot be
pursued without deviations from other economic targets, which are
on the agenda as -well. Also, the deviations from the growth target or
the target of price stability have adverse long-term effects on un-
employment as well.-61-
35. A successful strategy wauld_xa.th.er-hay-eJ:.Q_bjeJjnBlg.
inented into
a solution assigning_policy instruments to policy targets in a way
that an optimal combination can be achieved. As far as the target
of minimum involuntary unemployment is concerned (the whole
strategy is described in Part D), the elements of the policy to be
pursued should be:
da) Creating Jobs through Increasing Productive Capacity
36. Because of the recession in most industrialized countries the
stock of capital, which is still economically useful, is too small
to provide_jobs for all who want to work at the currently expected
real income. Investment in capital should therefore be the present
priority, which will be productive in creating new jobs and thus
contribute to the solution of the unemployment problem.
37. What governmerits can_cLo in this respect is to induce private in-
vestment through a permanent tax cut or more depreciation
allowances_for_iirms. Thisjwould contribute to cover the higher
risk of investment and to overcome the shortage of capital. Also,
governments should increase their own investment expenditures
- mainly as a shift away from government consumption. This is,
however, not to be understood as a short-run stimulation of
economic activity but rather a long-run contribution to economic
growth. A strategy like this has been suggested for West Germany .
db) Reducing the Relative Price of Labour g
38. The key element conducive to more private investment and thus a
higher level of employment is to reduce the price of labour relative
to that of capital. Therefore, the responsibility for employment
The program has been described as 'Wachsturnspolitische Vorsorge'
in: Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 1976/77. Stuttgart, Mainz, December
1976.-62-
rests on those who make decisions about the level of wages:
=^> employers and unions. A necessary condition for an increase of
employment is that the gainin_real wages fallg-b.elow—the_dis-tr-ibut-
able increase in productivity.
39. The main consequences of this strategy will be
- that existing jobs which are less productive will become compe-
titive again;
- that more investment will occur for the reason of expanding the
capital stock rather than of rationalization;
- that it will help - together with a contribution from the govern-
ment - to share the burden of the higher risk of innovation in
connection with the creation of new jobs.
40. It should be possible for peop_le_havmg a job to show this kincLQf
sqlidarity_with the unemployed, instead of 'protecting
3 themselves
through higher wage_increas_es and leaving many workers outside.
If monetary policy is geared to the reduction of inflation rates, they
will not have to fear that their retention will be disappointed, but
their negotiated real income will indeed materialize.
dc) Increase Wage Rate Flexibility
41. Not only more flexibility of wage levels is a means conducive to
solve the unemployment problem but also more flexibility__wijjiin
the wage structure. Relative wages should be allowed to adjust in
such a way that higher than average increases are paid for those
meeting a higher demand, and gains below average are paid when
there is a surplus in the supply of labour. This would imply regional
as well as sectoral differences of wage contracts but also the
abolishment of the institution of minimum wages.
Consequently, the risks of several groups to become unemployed
(see Chapter II c) would decline, because the wage structure would-63-
be allowed to adjust to the structure of productivity. This would
promote the equalization of the competitive position of all groups.
dd) Encourage Labour Mobility
42. Since it is not possible to forecast exactly in which regions and in
which sectors new jobs will be created, it is necessary that workers
arejlexible enough to adjust to new situations. Therefore, there is
a need for assistance to those people who have to move in order to
get the job that suits them. Furthermore, educational and vocation-
al training should be offered to those who cannot find a position in
that field they had originally been employed in.
4 3. Some of the suggestions made in this section are being pursued in
a few countries, however, one should not expect quick successes.
Social groups, especially governments and unions, have to show
patience rather than search for short-lived "solutions". The
achievement of full employment is only possible in the medium-run
because firstly, in order to avoid a rekindling of inflation, the re-
covery will have to be moderate. This means only a gradual in-
crease of the utilization of the production potential. Secondly, struc-
tural changes to adjust to new demand and supply conditions take a
longer time, especially since they have been to a large extent delayed
in recent years.-65-
C. Weakness of Investment Activity
I. Sluggish Investment Demand since 1975
1. One of the characteristic features of the current upswing in nearly
all industrial countries has not only been the low level of demand
for fixed investment but also its slow recovery. As a matter of fact
the upturn of investment activity since the trough of the business cycle
in 1975 has been weaker than in all post-war recoveries (Figure C 1).
In order to illustrate the difference between the course of real
investment during various cycles, the volume of total investment
for every cycle is transformed into an index and shown in Figure C 1.
The respective base year is determined by the lower turning point
of the business cycle, measured in terms of the utilization rate of
overall capacity. For every major cycle, investment activity is
shown for the two years before and after the trough.
2. Although common to all industrial countries, the weakness of
investment activity is in some countries more pronounced than in
others:
- The most disappointing development of investment has been
experienced in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium
and Switzerland. In these countries, investment activity did not
increase at all in 1976, i. e. in the first year after the trough; in
some of them a further - though slight - decrease is estimated
for the second year. Even if total investment for 1977 should turn
out to be higher than assumed at the beginning of the year, the
course of investment spending during the present upswing will
differ considerably from that one of the late fifties which also
developed after a marked decline of investment. Italy is the major
exception, where it was the recession of 1964/65 which led to
the severest contraction of investment demand. However, even-66-
at that time a greater part of the decline than now had already been
compensated in the ensuing upswing.
- In the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Austria,
Sweden and Denmark, investment activity has risen since the
beginning of the upswing, but mostly at a slower pace than in
comparable phases of previous cycles. Even in the United States
where investment demand has recovered comparatively fast, the
pre-recession level of investment will not be reached after the
two years' upswing as it was the case during the cycles 1956/60
and 1968/72. In some European countries - Austria and Belgium -,
the increase of investment is, indeed, more pronounced than
at the same stage of previous cycles. But those were cycles which
did not see a decline during the downswing phase - consequently,
investment demand faltered in those cycles rather early after the
trough, definedas the lowest utilization rate of overall capacity.
3. In nearly all countries, investment in construction has been weaker
than investment in machinery and equipment (Table C 1). The
United States are the major exception where housing has expanded
more rapidly; Belgium and the Netherlands seem to be the only
European countries, where a similar constellation prevails. In all
other countries, particularly in Germany, Austria and Italy, invest-
ment in construction has developed rather slowly or even declined.
Since specific information about the demand for structures is not
available for all countries, the data for machinery and equipment
were subtracted from those for total investment in order to get a
rough idea of the development of economic activity in this section
(Table C 1). Each series was measured as an index, for which the
base is given by the year of a business cycle trough. A positive sign
indicates that the recovery of construction is stronger than in the
other parts of investment. The calculations cover also the business
cycles in the late fifties. Table C 1 shows that the demand for-67-
Figure C 1






































































































































































construction, mainly for housing picked up very quickly and'strongly
• •- after every trough in the United States whereas such a pattern
cannot be found for Europe. /" '
Table C 1 - Development of Investment in Construction for Several Countries
a
1956-1960 and 1973-1977
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'• Difference between the data for total investment and for machinery and
' equipment - each measured as an index. Base years are the years of a
i business cycle trough (1958, 1975).
4. The employment effect of total'fixed investment has diminished in
recent years, although the data do not permit an exact calculation.
But the additional labour which could be hired after the implement-
ation of one unit of new capital must be much smaller because of the
increasing portion of social capital in total new capital which is
designed to improve the infrastructure and the quality of life. In
addition to that, a greater part of investment is assigned to the pur-
pose of rationalization and replacement. In Germany, for instance,
about 55 % of total industrial investment in 1962 was induced by the
motivation to rationalize and to replace according to the investment-69-
survey of the Ifo-Institut, whereas in 1976 this portion climbed
up to 77 %.
II. Causes for the Weakness of Investment Demand
5. The fact that the demand for capital goods is weak in all western
countries seems to suggest common causes. Perhaps the most
important one is the synchronized, •inflationary boom of 1972/73
and the way_j.n which economic policy and economic units oiLall
countries reacted during the following years. Consequently, the
expectations of net return on investment no doubt fell considerably.
Thetexpectations have not only been influenced by the experience
in respect to wages, prices, interest rates and sales but in some
countries also by the fear that left-wing parties may alter the socio-
political situation fundamentally and nationalize private capital. ^
a) Low Level of Profits after the 'Stabilization-Crisis'
6. During the recession of 1974/75 profits fell to an unusually_low I
lfiYiLL which has been too small a basis for a rapid recovery of
investment. The profit squeeze was due to the cyclical phenomenon
of the 'stabilization-crisis' of 1973-75, and to structural changes
of supply and demand which are not easily to separate:
- The 'stabilization-crisis' was mainly characterized by the
worjLening of the terms of trade of firms: Whereas the input
prices continued for some time to rise rather steeply, the up-
ward movement of the output prices was dampened by monetary
restraint which was initiated sooner or later almost everywhere.
The housing sector was hit the most by the unexpected and
decisive change of monetary policy. Moreover, the profit squeeze
was intensified_by_the_fac.t-thai_d,e.Kreciation charges as well as
inventory accounting was mostly based on historicalvalues in-
stead of replacement values. Since the latter have rapidly-70-
Figure C 2










































































































Total real fixed investment; change from previous year in '/..
Share of labour income in national income, at constant share of wage and salary employees
(1956), change from previous year in '/•.-71-
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Share of labour income in national income, at constant share of wage and salary employees
(1956); change from previous year in '/..-72-
increased in the last years, only nominal profits were large.
Hence, taxes were_too high-in relation to realjrofits.
- As a consequence of the profit squeeze, firms dismissed workers
or went bankrupt. The ensuing fall in income and employment
induced further declines of economic activity at home and via
the transmission of international trade also in other countries,
causing sales' expectations to deteriorate even more.
- The bad profit position was aggravated in the course of major
structural changes: the huge rise in the price for energy as well
as the intensified application of environmental protection
regulations increased the obsolescence of parts of the existing
capital stock. Capital became scarce relatiye_tQ_labo«^, a_deve-
lopmjsnj^whjjih^jar^^
in relaj^pji-4a--r-eal_profits. Since nominal wages were rather sticky
and the monetary authorities restricted the expansion of money
supply, profits were even more depressed.
7. The alleged importance of profits for investment shall be demonstrated
for some major countries. Being a major cost item, labour income
influences largely the profit situation and investment demand. It
is supposed that an increase of wages and salaries depressed__the
propensity to invest_if it.is._nojLPQSsible to neutralize this effect either
by rajsing prices and the rate of productivity or by dismissing^the
workers who are overpaid. The negative effect on investment will
be the more pronounced the higher the share of labour income in
national income has already been.
As a matter of fact, the suggested inverse relationship between
investment demand and the share of labour income in national income
is clearly shown for the United States, Germany and Japan (Figure
C 2). In Germany and Japan, the persistent increase of the share
of labour income since 1968 would seem to have contributed much to-73-
the weakness of investment demand in the early seventies. In the
United States, however, the decrease of the share in 1972 and 197 3
may have favoured not only the investment upswing at that time but
also the recovery in 1976 which is more pronounced than in all
other countries. The decrease of the share in the two consecutive
years 1972 and 1973 may have prevented too high a level of labour
income in relation to profits which would have depressed investment.
In the United Kingdom, France and Italy, the inverse relationship
between the change of investment and the change of profits did not
exist as clearly as in the countries mentioned above. This is partly
due to the poor statistics which do not even allow of some more
refinement in the analysis (profits after and before taxes, for instance),
but partly also due to other factors than profit which influence in-
vestment activity. France and Italy are comparatively "young"
industrialized countries in which a sufficient high return on capital
can be expected for the medium run, whereas the United Kingdom is
one of the "oldest" in which the prospects have been dampened
systematically by the "stop-and-go-policy" during the sixties.
8. The level of profits has not only been very low at the bottom of the
recession but has in general risen up to now only gradually; the
fear that the profit situation would deteriorate further has vanished
only slowly. The persistence of the low profit level is well demon-
strated by the fact that the number of business failures has increased
until quite recently as well as by the rather bearish performance of
the stock-exchange. The share prices have gone up hesitantly in all
major countries as well as in the smaller countries (Figure C 3).
Some setback has occurred even in the United States and Germany,
where the stock prices have risen markedly and well before the
trough of the recession, measured as the lowest rate of capacity
utilization in industry. The performance of the stock markets in all
countries suggests that the prospects for profits have not been
considered very good and that mostly it might not have been a-74-
Figure C 3
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The index of share prices has the value 100 in that quarter in which the
utilization rate in manufacturing is the lowest. l.f. W.Kiel-75-
favourable time for lowering the ratio of debt to equity in corporate
balance sheets. In Europe, the recent development of share prices
has been disappointing both in comparison to the United States and
to the late fifties and early sixties.
b) Higher Risks as an Impediment for an Early Upswing of Investment
9. The rather long delay of the recovery of investment activity may
also be due to the fact that investors try to attain profit-standards
which are now somewhat higher than a few years ago: a higher
return and a shorter pay-off period may now be considered as
necessary to compensate for an increase of risks. The risks which
may not be equally felt by all investors reflect mainly the fear that
the course of economic policy and economic activity would not be
well established and sustained:
- The investors fear a rekindling of inflationjgntailing very soon the
next recession - or, even in contrast to that, they expect the
S°vernment to_pjjr_s:u.e^a.4>oliey._oi^oidy^ of
de^ruand. In both worlds, sales would not rise for an extended
period and not very much. Hence, they are not induced to widen the
capital stock on a large scale as long as overcapacity exists in
many industries.
The firms expect a new upsurge of wage claims very soon. This
expectation is based on the experience of recent years in which it
was only possible by incomes policy and very high unemployment
rates to dampen real wages. A retention of wage claims was most-
ly overdue in view of the fact that the terms of trade of all
industrial countries had deteriorated very much since the end
of 1973.
The entrepreneurs fear that the lenders of capital would restrict
business policy and raise the costs for credit more sharply and
promptly in all those countries in which the monetary authorities-76-
do not any longer pursue a highly permissive policy. This fear
is based on the experience of the last years when they were heavi-
ly indebted and not free to take their own decisions. Hence, the
entrepreneurs try to lessen the burden of external debt and are
not ready to engage in new credits on a large scale. Real interest
rates do not seem to have fallen sufficiently to overcome the lethar-
gy of investors which is particularly valid for housing.
10. Besides these risks of a more cyclical nature there are those due to
major_stxuctural changes. The shift of relative prices during the last
years has intensified the search for new products, techniques and
locations. Since this process needs some time and the old production
lines have become economically obsolete, the net result is a flat
development of investment activity. This is well demonstrated by the
two following cases:
- Whereas the profitability of investment in the automobile industry
of the industrialized countries is widely held not to be very high
for the medium run, although the boom in this industry since 1975
has pushed up the profits, it has recently been made more difficult
to calculate the profitability of investment projects in energy-
related industries, i. e. in those industries which are regarded as
i ^^ iVii.R ^
n-
e l
ea-ding ones: the public has become much more sensitive to
^ ' / factors affecting the quality of life which may result in a delay of
investment decisions and an increase of the costs of new capital.
- In Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and perhaps in Switzerland,




g-fyr>m thp respective home country
to foreign countries. For Germany, this tendency is clearly to be
seen in the increased outflow of capital for direct investment. This
diversion of investment funds may have been intensified by the fact
that some less developed countries have become more attractive
for investors in the last years. In those countries, however, which-77-
have increased their competitiveness by large devaluations of
their currencies and for which an export-led upswing of invest-
ment could have been expected, the propensity to invest has been
dampened by the fear that the return on capital may be diminished
substantially: the fear is based on the expectation that left-wing
parties will come into power and introduce some form of co-
determination or even socialize private capital.
III. Policies Adopted to Stimulate Investment Activity
11. In all industrial countries, global as well as selective measures
have been taken since 1975 to stimulate private investment. Out-
standing examples of the selective incentives are the investment
tax credit in the United States, the temporary investment subsidy
in Germany, the acceleration of depreciation allowances in France
and Denmark and the release of funds for investment purposes in
Sweden and Switzerland. The policy to encourage investment which
is pursued by monetary and fiscal authorities in all countries may
be characterized in the following way:
- firstly, the measures have been taken step by step. The basic
idea was to prop up investment demand without rekindling infla-
tionary expectations, widening the public deficit too much or
worsening the external balance;
- secondly, the measures have been mostly part of greater programs.
This holds true not only for ' strong' countries but also for ' weak'
countries which tried to pursue a less expansionary course in
general. In the latter countries tax relief for firms, particularly
for small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as govern-
ment loans at subsidized rates have been granted; credits to
investors have been exempted from credit controls.-78-
12. The policy measures have brought about "the turnaround of invest-
ment demand and shortened the delay which otherwise would have
taken place because of all the dampening factors mentioned above.
However, by their very nature, the measures have not brought
about a steady upswing: since they were mostly terminated, at
least initially, and since the prospects for the medium term had
not improved very much, the investors were induced to realize
many of those projects which otherwise would have been under-
taken at a later date. Hence, investment demand in Germany and
France have moved in a zig-zag-line (Figure C 4). The more
technical setback has sometimes been interpreted as a more
general setback, indeed. But it was overlooked that the stock of
orders has risen,thereby improving the business climate.
Thus, the more recent incentives will be more successful than
those of the earlier programs. Moreover, the increase of public
investment as well as the official support of private research
projects in Germany and France for instance are of special
interest because these measures will help to raise the productivi-
ty of private capital even in the longer run.
13. The demand for machinery and equipment, measured by new
orders or indicated by business surveys, has recently picked up
in some countries thus fore-shadowing a further upturn of invest-
ment activity in the coming months (Figure C 4). Although the
statistics should be read very carefully, the countries can be
classified into the following groups:
- In the United States and Germany, there is now a solid basis
for a further increase of investment demand both through the
policies pursued and the profit situation already achieved. As
to the performance of leading indicators, the United Kingdom
and Sweden may fit into this group as well.-79-
Figure C 4
LEADING INDICATORS OF INVESTMENT IN DURABLE EQUIPMENT(—)
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Indicators of investment in
durable equipment (left scale):
new orders in capital goods ind.
(United States); orders for
machinery, priv. exc. ships (Japan);
new home orders in investment
goods ind.,volume (West Germany);
net balance of'up' and "down"
of business surveys in the
investment goods ind. (France,
Italy, United Kingdom); new
home engineering orders (United
Kingdom); net new orders in
engineering (Sweden). —
Indicators of investment In
construction (right scale):
new priv. housing starts (United
States); building construction
starts (Japan); building con-
struction permits (WestGermany,
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy);
work put in place (France, Austria);
new orders for construction (United
Kingdom); dwellings in progress
(Sweden).
l.f.W. Kiel-80-
- In France and Japan, investment demand will start to rise in the
coming months. This view is supported by the recent programs
to encourage investment and the improvement of the profit
situation, which has been particularly strong in Japan. In
Italy, however, the upturn of investment will lose some of its
momentum in the course of 1977.
14. The prospects for investment in construction, as indicated by
permits and housing starts, are generally not as favourable as for
machinery and equipment. The main causes are that this type of
investment has been less supported by govern men 1s and that many
firms,engaged in building and selling houses on a large scale,have
gone bankrupt in recent years.
A rather strong upturn of investment in construction can be ex-
pected for the United States, Netherlands, Japan and Austria,
whereas in the United Kingdom &nd perhaps in Switzerland, too,
there will be a decline. In all other countries, the upturn will
be rather mediocre.
15. Investment demand will accelerate somewhat in the months to
come as it was the case in all upswing periods up to now. But the
hindrances discussed above do not support the view that this process
of self-inducing investment will be very strong. A fundamental
change to a more normal course of investment is to be expected
after money illusion has vanished and economic policy has abandoned
the "stop-and go-cycle". This change implies a smoothening of
the investment cycle by preventing too strong a recovery at the
beginning and too strong a decline at the end of the cycle. This
view holds also true for the inventory cycle which is very difficult
to analyze because of the lack of reliable statistics.-81-
D. The Case for New Strategies of Economic Policy
1. Extremely high unemployment in nearly every country and a weak
propensity to invest - i. e. too low capacity growth - are the most
urgent, but not the only problems for economic policy makers this
year. Rather, they also have to fight inflation, to reduce the balance
of payments disequilibria and besides that to keep budget deficits under
control.
Obviously, economic policy authorities are expected to solve these
problems simultaneously. Given this complex task, we shall argue
in this section,
- that conventional demand management methods cannot be applied as
a multi-purpose weapon for fighting unemployment as well as inflation
and external imbalances: expansionary monetary and fiscal measures
for fighting unemployment run the risk of higher inflation; austerity
measures for improving the balance of payments worsen the employment
situation;
- that, instead of this, a rational policy mix must be implemented in-
cluding flexible exchange rates and a definite assignment of monetary,
wage ancLfiacal-policy to the price, employment and growth target,
respectively;
- that such a strategy for stable expansion has not been fully realized
in economic policy up to now: while a number of so-called strong coun-
tries have implemented a steadier policy stance with some success,
many so-called weak countries have again experienced the disadvantages
of stop-and-go measures;
- that international co-oj-djjTgtioj^of economic policy therefore should be
dejgjj^ejLjLS^an^ltempt not__for_T3£g^g.£.ving but for ^liminating^Jirteriiational
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Sources: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, current issues. ILO, Bulletin of Labour Statistics, current issues. National sources.-83-
I. Still Far Away from Economic Targets
2. Since the beginning of the worldwide upswing in 1975, the progress in
approximating satisfactory levels of the main policy target variables has
been generally very limited. Presently, the deviations from a high employ-
ment level, from price stability and external equilibrium are still by far
too large. This becomes particularly clear in comparison with the situation
of the 60' s and the early 70' s, as shown in Table D 1. In 1976, rather low
unemployment rates could only be kept by a few small countries, e.g.
Sweden, Austria and Switzerland. Moreover, Switzerland was the only
country which approximated price stability in 1976, while the average
inflation rate of the whole OECD area amounted to 11 percent on a year
over year basis. Additionally,the current balance disequilibria widened
drastically last year after they had decreased considerably during the re-
cession 1974/75.
3. In addition to the problems of unemployment, inflation and external im-
balances, the 1976 public deficits were extremely high again, although in
some cases smaller than 1975, when record increases occurred due to
cyclical shortfalls of revenues and to reflationary fiscal packages.
Governments are also deeply concerned about the level of national and
international indebtedness, primarily in countries like Italy, United Kingdom
and Denmark. The raising of domestic and international funds became in-
creasingly difficult for these countries in 1976. Consequently, governments
were forced to renounce their expansionary policies in favour of a somewhat
more moderate course and the monetary authorities had to give up their
attempts to keep the exchange rates unchanged.
II. Demand Management Strategies Outdated
4. In the course of the inflationary period of recent years, demand manage-
ment policies have become mo,re_and._mp.rje_ineffectiveJ_j2gga.use money il-
lusion has largely_fade.d_o.ui._ In the international context exchange rate illu--84-
led: it has become more and more clear that
variations ofjexcharLge rates do not change international competi-
tiyepositions as far as they__only_compens.ate for inflation differ-
entials from country to country. Thus, in order to reduce external
disequilibria, real exchange rate changes are necessary, i. e. ex-
change rate variations which more than outweigh inflation differ-
entials.
a) No Trade-off Between Unemployment and Inflation
5. Looking at the two tasks of increasing employment and reducing
inflation, empirical evidence shows that one should(noytake for
granted a certain, relatively stable Phillips-type trade-off be-
tween unemployment and inflation. In Figure D 1, the different
combinations of the rates of unemployment and consumer price
increases were depicted for six major countries. Instead of
Phillips curves, one can rather - more or less clearly - identify
a sort of "Phillips curls", a phenomenon which is characterized
by growing fluctuations of unemployment and inflation rates around
an increasing trend.
The mechanism which has seemingly determined this unstable
process since 1960 can be explained as_follows: If_a_certain_un-
employment levelis considered as _too_high, governments use...to
take expansionary monetary an^fij^al^me^agures to stimulate aggreg-
atedemand and to increase emplfiy_men_t. Whereasjthe inflationary
impulse^s limited at first - due to ample capacity and time_lag.sn.i-n
price formation - inflationary pressure will grow dujring the follow -
Li^^ At the_same time,
the balanj^e_Qf-payxaents of those economies, accustomed to high
imjjort elasticities use to deteriorate^ Payments deficits, devaluat-
ion tendencias_andJaigh domestic inflation rates are signals for a-85-
Figure D 1
























































































































change_of the policy—cjonrse: governments deem it necessary to
restrict aggregate demand by a monetary-fiscal "stop" policy.
The outcome will be a reduction of production and employment,
accompanied_by.an_improvement in the balance of payments. The
subsequent cooling-down of inflation, however, will be the smaller
the more downward rigidity in inflation expectations prevails.
The U.S. economy seems to be a good example to elucidate this
process of increasing fluctuations along a trend of more and more
unfavourable combinations between unemployment and inflation .
6. Taking into account the price and employment forecasts for 1977,
the question arises whether the period of recession-related de-
celeration of inflation rates will soon come to an end or whether
the re-ignition of inflation in Italy and the United Kingdom will
only be the exception. The threat of a new round of resurgent in-
flation in spite of very high unemployment rates will be the more
probable, the more policy authorities will take expansionary mone-
tary measures to support the upswing. As there seems to exist
a spiral with increasing fluctuations instead of a stable trade-off
between inflation and unemployment, such a development must be
avoided.
b) The Dilemma of Unemployment and External Deficits
7. Besides the trade-off problem between unemployment and in-
flation there is another unfavourable combination of target vari-
ables: the combination of unemployment and external deficits. Since
last year this problem has become very important again for the
The development in Japan and Italy does not prove the ' Phillips-
curl thesis' as clearly as in other countries, for their unemploy-
ment levels are kept low by specific institutional factors - such as
the principle of lifelong employment or laws restricting dismissals.-87-
so-called weak countries, - those countries characterized by
structural current balance deficits which are not compensated by
a corresponding private net capital inflow.
8. During the recovery of demand and production, the rise of real
imports in countries like France and Denmark exceeded by far
the increase of their real exports (see Figure D 2). Hence, their
trade deficits, in volume terms, widened considerably. This is
also true for the United States, whereas notably Japan and the
Netherlands increased their real surpluses.
Many of the deficit countries still try to maintain their exchange
rates. Instead of supporting adjustment processes by changes in
international price relations, they apparently resort to restrictive
demand policies in order to reduce external deficits and, at the
same time, to curb inflation. But these "stop" measures lead in-
evitably to a worsening of the employment situation. The policy
dilemma - either more employment, but increasing external dif-
ficulties, or a better external position, but higher unemployment -
is sometimes looked upon to be unsolvable.
9. Obviously, the difficulties cannot be eliminated by frequent
shifls of priorities between the employment and the external target
- and, additionally, the stabilization target - using "stop-go" demand
management methods; this can only bring about a short-term relief.
Rather, in order to solve the particularly severe problems of "weak"
countries a new path of economic policy must be followed which is
suited to tackle the problems simultaneously.-88-
Figure D 2
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III. General Features of a Strategy for Stable Economic Expansion
10. The strategy which is needed to overcome the current difficulties
„ without producing new future problems, must comprise a rational
mix_pX.gQiicxJI3^Jrumen_ts which is appropriate to attain .higJx-empj.oy-
ment, low inflation rates, external equilibrium, and a suitable
v
1 ^J growth rate at the same time.
Since private decision making should be backed by a steady economic
policy, discretionary interventions must be abolished as far as pos-
sible.
11. The Train piements of a rational assignment of measures and aims
are
- flexible exchange_xa±£SJ they are the only means which lead to
balance of payments equilibrium by market forces; they provide
the necj?Sj5ary conditionfor the autonomy of domestic stabilization
policies;
- a steady, trend-oriented monetary policy: a pre-announced, steady
and moderate, course of the money supply provides the frame for
price and wage behaviour and thus contributes to more predictability
in the trends of price and wage levels; moreover, a g_radual de_aele_£zL
ation of monetary expansion down to the growth rate of potential GNP
leads to price stability without substantial frictions;
- flexibility of real wages: the relation between real wages and labour
productivity - adjusted for changes in the terms of trade and relative
capiial_e_QS_ts - determines the employment level. If the rate of real
wage increases stays below the rate of distributable productivity
gains, then the demand for labour will rise; this should be the
guiding principle for the wage policy of employers, unions and
governments in order to reduce the under-utilization of the labour
force;-91.
- a steady_course of fiscal policy: instead of intervening anti-
cyclically, governments should guarantee that the proportion
of potential output which is absorbed by the public sector - i. e.
the proportion of real public expenditure - does not vary sub-
stantially in the course of a cycle. (This does not exclude changes
of the public share in the medium and long run.) Taxes should
operate as an automatic stabilizer during the cycle. Whereas the
success of fiscal activities to counteract short-term fluctuations
has to be viewed as very limited, fiscal measures are suited as
a means of growth policy if the expenditure side as well as the
tax system is geared to support investment.
IV. 1976: Economic Policy Towards Moderation
12. Compared with the above mentioned strategy for stable expansion,
the stance of monetary and fiscal policy in most western countries
was still by far too volatile since 1975. Whereas in 1975 many
countries started with a highly expansionary drive of their demand
management policies, most of them turned to a moderation of their
policies in the course of 1976. Compared with former recoveries
this change occuned at an early stage of the upswing. However, some
moderation was indispensable in the light of comparatively high in-
flationary pressures on the one hand and extensive balance of pay-
ments deficits on the other.
13. The characteristics of the policy developments in 1975/76 were:
- the actions and reactions of monetary and fiscal agencies in many
countries have shown the well-known go-stop pattern. Only in a
few countries, such as the United States, Japan and - not so im-
pressively - in Germany, economic policies have followed a re-
latively stable path;-92-
- the 1976 events in demand management policies have demonstrat-
ed the dominance of the strong countries like the United States,
Japan and West Germany. Countries with high balance of pay-
ment deficits and an important external sector sooner or later
aligned their internal policy towards more moderation in order
to avoid further sharp devaluations of their currencies;
- along with the moderation of monetary and fiscal policies, most
countries came up with intensified incomes policies in 1976 in
order to restrain wage and price claims. This reflects the more
and more acknowledged fact that the employment level lastly is
determined by private market behaviour;
- the sharp exchange rate adjustments in the course of 197 6 brought
about sizable changes in international price competitiveness which
were favourable in respect to a settlement of the international
balance of payments problems.
a) Turnaround in Monetary Policy
14. Monetary policy in the industrialized countries during 1976 was
characterized by a - more or less clear - departure from the high-
ly expansionary path of 1975. This step was uiavoidable because in-
flation dynamics had to be reduced further. Whereas the monetary
aggregate M accelerated worldwide by an annual rate of more than
10 percent until spring 1976,the rate has slowed down to about 7 per-
cent since then. However, behind these general figures there is a
considerable divergent development from country to country: in the
United States and Japan the monetary path was relatively steady.
On the contrary,countries like France, the United Kingdom, Italy,
the Netherlands and Denmark introduced sharp restraints in 1976
(Figure D 3) in order to limit pressures for further massive de-
valuations.-93-
15. As a result of these policy changes, the differentials between
short-term interest rates on international money markets tem-
porarily widened substantially. To a much less extent this was
true for long-term interest rates. This indicates steps towards
an operation-twist in several deficit countries: central banks tried
to discourage capital outflows by high short-term rates and, at the
same time, to encourage domestic investment by relatively favour-
able long-term interest rates thus providing even for negative real
rates of interest.
In the "strong" countries (United States, Japan, Germany) long-
term interest rates tended only slowly downwards in the course of
197 6, indicating that inflation expectations were reduced only
gradually in these countries. To some extent this might be due to the
debt management of governments, which, given its expectation back-
ground, considered a lenghtening of the maturity of public borrowing
more profitable than a reduction of nominal interest rates for shorter
maturities. Only since autumn 1976 when public credit demand ex-
panded more slowly, long-term interest rates have started to decrease
markedly in some countries.
b) Cautious Fiscal Policies
16. Like monetary authorities, fiscal agencies also pursued a less ex-
pansionary policy in 197 6 than in the year before. In most countries
public expenditures increased at substantially lower rates. At the
same time a strong fiscal drag due to a rather high nominal income
expansion and to unchanged nominal tax tariffs retarded the growth
of private net incomes. Additionally, many temporary stimulation
measures like tax cuts, higher transfers and public expenditure
programs expired in 1976. Some governments, notably in Italy and
Denmark, even increased direct and indirect taxes to restrain private
consumption in order to reduce high import surpluses.Figure D 3
-94-
Fig.D.3 MONEY SUPPLY, GOVERNMENT BORROWING
AND INTEREST RATES IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
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17. The dampening fiscal measures occurred in a relatively early stage
of upswing. They were brought about mainly in concern of the sub-
stantial public deficits which accumulated since 1974. Limiting net
borrowings was considered to be necessary because of the fear of
a crowding out of private investment, recognizing the behaviour of
the central banks to hold monetary expansion under control. That
is why most countries experienced a reduction of the ratio of
public deficits to nominal GNP in 197 6 which had increased consider-
ably in previous years due to the high underutilization of capacity
(seeTable D 2). This policy, however, implied that real public ex-
penditures mostly increased much more slowly than potential real
GNP. Apparently, such a policy has dampened the dynamics of re-
covery (see Table D 3).
c) Intensified Efforts of Incomes Policy
18. If real wage increases exceed the distributable labour productivity
gains over a longer period of time, the employment situation in-
evitably deteriorates sooner or later. This fact can be illustrated
by Figure D 4 and B 2.
In 1975, for example France and Austria experienced a gap between
real wage increases and productivity changes of temporarily more
than 10 percent, Italy of nearly 20 percent. (These figures, however,
are partly determined by cyclical factors. ) On the other hand,the
United States experienced even absolutely falling real wages for two
years up to the end of 1975. Switzerland, Germany, and the Nether-
lands have had relatively small real wage rises which have not come
up to productivity increases for longer periods either. Therefore
, these economies seem to be in a better-than-average position in
respect to reducing unemployment. (Indeed, at least in the United

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Issues, current issues. - National sources.-99-
19. A great deal of the large fluctuations of real wages, which could
be observed in recent years, is not only attributable to the abrupt-
ness of monetary policy but also to the pay settlements between
trade unions and employers.
Since the beginning of the seventies, the dynamics of the inflation-
ary process of wage and price increases were particularly strong
in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan: between 197 3 and 1975,
nominal wage rates went up by 25 to 30 percent (year over year;
see Figure D 4), and consumer prices sometimes by more than
20 percent. In other countries, nominal wage increases ranged from
about 10 percent (United States, Germany, Switzerland) to about
20 percent (France, Belgium, Austria). Generally, nominal wage
increases decelerated during 1976 although the development was
still rather different from country to country.
20. In many cases, the recent cooling down of wage increases coincides
with - more or less tough - measures of incomes policy. Since 1975,
they were applied particularly by those countries where - in spite of
the deep recession - the dynamics of the wage-price spiral were
very strong.
In the United Kingdom pay rises have been limited by a "social con-
tract" between the government and the trade unions since mid-1975.
It is going to be renewed in summer 1977. Denmark and the Nether-
lands - like the United Kingdom for a long time familiar with incomes
policy activities - have also tried successfully to keep control of
wage increases. In France, the Barre-Plan of September 1976 includes
limits for wage and price rises, coupled with a price freeze for some
months. Price freezes have also been applied in Spain and Portugal.
Figure D 4 shows the inflation rates as the difference between the
curves of nominal and real wage rate changes.Figure D 4
-100-
NOMINAL WAGES, REAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN MAJOR
COUNTRIES
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Figure D 4
NOMINAL WAGES, REAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN SMALLER
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On the other hand, wages in Germany and Austria, for example, have
increased only modestly since 1975 and 1976, respectively, because
of the high degree of "social consensus" between unions, employers
and the government.
21. In assessing the recently applied incomes policy measures, one
has to keep in mind two critical points:
- If wage and/or price increases are fixed (voluntarily or on a
statutory basis), the mechanism of relative prices cannot operate
any longer. Consequently, adjustment needs are accumulated,
which must be met sooner or later. Usually, they materialize as
sharp price and wage jumps after expiration of the agreements.
- Up to now, the coordination of incomes policy and monetary policy
has proved to be rather insufficient. Inconsistencies have often
1 occurred, because monetary policy was directed to the interest
rate or balance of payments target; that is why incomes policy
measures use to be only "tough on pay and weak on prices" as long
as they are not complemented by a steady and moderate policy .
of monetary expansion.
d) Economic Policy Dominance of "Strong" Countries
22. One of the obvious features in economic policy in the mid 70's is
the fact that the speed in economic stimulation, worldwide and in
each particular country, is ultimately determined by the "strong"
countries.
In the United States, Germany and Japan demand management
policies weregouverned by the conviction that a durable upswing
after the sharp 1974/75 recession can only be achieved by a policy
geared to a further slowdown of inflation. In pursuing such a policy,
central banks defined targets for monetary expansion in terms of-103-
money supply aggregates (as in the United States and Germany)
or bank credits (Japan). The implementation of these concepts,
nevertheless, shows some deficiencies:
- in Germany the money supply (monetary base) in 1975 and 1976
exceeded the announced targets. The same is true for the money
supply in the definition of M and M in the case of the United
States;
- in addition to failing the average targets, central banks did not
avoid sharp fluctuations of monetary expansion during this period.
Especially Germany experienced pronounced phases of monetary
accelaration and deceleration. The ultimate reason for this is
that up to now central banks pursue not only money supply targets
but, at the same time, interest rate targets. This is illustrated
by the fact that even short-term interest rates showed a higher
stability over time than monetary expansion rates.
2 3. Total credit expansion in the three major countries remained
moderate in the course of 1976 after it had gained some momentum
in Germany and Japan during 1975. In each of the three countries
the credit expansion was largely brought about by the public sector.
In Japan the share of government borrowing requirements on total
bank credits nearly tripled between mid-1974 and 1976, whereas in
West Germany there was almost a doubling of the corresponding
ratio (see Figure D 3).
The strong expansion of public sectors' credit demand until the
end of 1976 was accomodated by monetary policies indicating strong
links between fiscal and monetary agencies: in Germany and Japan
the money supply expanded to that extent necessary to keep interest
rates on money and capital markets on their downward trend despite
an increasing total credit demand. In the second half of 1976, this
interdependence worked in reverse direction: following a slower-104-
credit demand by public authorities, monetary expansion deceler-
ated considerably.
24. The slowdown in public sectors* credit requirements reflects higher
tax receipts since mid-1976 on the one hand and accentuated efforts
to cut the^expansion of public expenditures on the other hand. In
addition to the growing concern about public deficits, the behaviour
of fiscal authorities during budgeting in the first part of 197 6 was
determined by the conviction that the reflation measures pursued in
1975 would have been successful in bringing about a self-sustained
upswing. In the case of Japan and, to some extent, of Germany the
favourable export performance - in connection with their improved
international competitiveness between 197 3 and 1975 when nominal
exchange rate changes lagged behind inflation differentials - might
have been important for the rather cautious stance of fiscal policies.
e) External Constraints for "Weak" Countries
25. The moderate course of monetary and fiscal policies in the "strong"
countries has operated as a policy constraint for all other countries:
since 1975, demand management policies in most European countries
were characterized by changing priorities between the employment
and external target. The outcome was a sharp up and down in the
monetary expansion and in the development of interest rates. This
highly unsteady policy course could not prepare the ground for a
balanced recovery in these countries.
The United Kingdom, Italy and France registered a monetary ac-
celeration, measured in terms of M in the range of 25 to 30 per-
cent between mid-1975 and 1976. Since then, the money growth rates
slowed down to 10 percent or less, accompanied by sharp increases
of interest rates in the course of 197 6, especially in Italy and in the
United Kingdom, producing temporarily very large interest differen-
tials against the "strong" currencies.-105-
26. The reason why countries like the United Kingdom, Italy, France
and Denmark started with a relatively expansionary monetary and
fiscal policy in 1975 must be seen as a wrong interpretation of the
improvement of their balance of payments in 1974/75: it was not
fully recognized that this was mainly the impact of the recession
and not of an increase in international competitiveness. The diminish-
ed deficits led to the expectation of relatively stable exchange rate
developments. As to their competitiveness many European countries
had in fact experienced a substantial deterioration since 197 3, be-
cause inflation differentials prevailed. These developments coincided
with international stand-by credits after the oil crisis of 197 3 which
prevented rather than enforced structural adjustments.
27. In 1976 a great disillusion materialized in most deficit countries:
already at the beginning of the upswing the balance of payments of
these countries deteriorated heavily once again. This indicated both
debtors and creditors that real exchange rates had to be reduced, i. e.
nominal exchange rates had to be changed to a much greater extent
than current inflation rates differed.
Instead of recognizing this fact, national authorities, wrongly under-
standing the task of international cooperation, initiated extensive
interventions on foreign exchange markets as long as possible.
Finally, however, considerable depreciations, notably of the
Italian Lira and the British Pound, could not be avoided. This was
the signal for the deficit countries to turn to a moderation of their
expansionary policy course.
28. The only alternative to avoid a further acceleration of inflation was
to dampen the overexpansionary policy course. Nevertheless, the
turnaround in policy was brought about too abruptly. This must be
judged as harmful for a balanced and steady economic development.-106-
The restrictive measures - above all the drastical changes of
short-term interest rates - were conceived not only to diminish
further inflation differentials but also to stop exchange rate ad-
justments for accumulated inflation differentials. This was the
case particularly in a number of European "snake"-countries. The
mini-realignment of October 197 6 brought about some relief, but
obviously a more pronounced adjustment would have helped the small
countries ,like the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden to pursue a
more steady monetary policy. The new exchange rate alignment of
March 1977 met lately with this necessity.
f) Sizable Changes in International Competitiveness by Exchange
Rate Adjustment
29. The sharp changes in nominal exchange rates, which occurred in the
course of 1976, brought about considerable corrections of most
countries' international price competitiveness. As effective nominal
exchange rate changes exceeded the differentials in current inflation
rates, they led to adjustments in real exchange rates, which prepar-
ed the ground for structural shifts in international trade and hence
for a settlement of international balance of payments problems. But
in many cases only those real exchange rates were restored.in 1976
which had existed already in 1973.
30. To analyze the competitive position of a number of industrialized
countries, nominal effective exchange rate changes were transform-
ed in real effective exchange rate changes by the use of consumer
prices (all goods less food), export prices (average values) and
unit labour costs (industry) . The differences which were found
The first step in calculating real effective exchange rate changes was
to divide the nominal exchange rates for each country by the specific
price or cost index. These "real" exchange rates were then used as
an input to produce for a given country a trade-weighted sum of real
exchange rate changes of all other currencies vis-a-vis this country.
The calculations were made on the basis of 14 industrialized countries.
The exchange rate changes refer to the first quarter of 1971.-107-
between the various calculations - see Figure D 5 - allow conclu-
sions concerning the price behaviour and the profit situation of
firms in different countries.
31. The analysis showed that in the course of 1976 the surplus countries
Germany, Japan, and Switzerland experienced a substantial real
appreciation of their currencies after, however, two years of real
depreciation. In the case of Japan and Germany, the change of com-
petitiveness proved to be different according to real exchange rates
on the basis of consumer prices or on unit labour costs: whereas for
Japan one could observe a less extensive deterioration of internation-
al competitiveness in terms of consumer prices compared to unit
labour costs, the opposite was true for Germany since the beginning
of 1975. . This may be partially explained by the behaviour of German
firms: they apparently tried to correct the income distribution in
their favour also by forced price increases on domestic markets.
32. In each of the surplus countries, especially in Japan, it is striking
that the real revaluation calculated on the basis of export prices was
considerably lower than that on the basis of consumer prices and
unit labour costs. Until the beginning of 1976, the real exchange rate
of Japan and - to a smaller extent of Germany - which was measured
in export prices, fell short of the level of early 1971. This reflects
the strong export mindedness of firms in these two countries. In
particular, the sharp real depreciation of the Yen since 1974 may be
an explanation for Japan's increasing share in world trade since
autumn 1975.
33. Similar to the development of the D-Mark the Gulden, Shilling, the
Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Krone as well as the Belgian Franc
experienced an increase of their real values in 1976, however, to a
smaller extent. On the basis of export prices their international-108-
Figure D 5
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competitiveness - with the exception of Denmark and Norway -
even improved, indicating persistently reserved price policies
of internationally engaged firms. This behaviour reflects the
fact that internal activity in these countries depends to a high
degree on external demand.
34. The US-Dollar continued its real appreciation in the first part of
197 6 which had started mid-1975. This resulted both from the
development of nominal exchange rates and the relatively good
progress in stabilization. It is to be noted that the competitive-
ness in terms of unit labour costs was much better than in terms
of export prices. To some extent this outcome may be due to the
U.S. export structure: a great deal of the exported goods (food,
raw materials) experienced a relatively strong price increase on
world markets in recent years.
35. Italy and the United Kingdom could improve their international
competitiveness considerably in 1976. In both countries, most of
the real depreciation which was already reached between
1971 and 1973, had disappeared until the end of 1975. For Italy
as well as for the United Kingdom it seems to be characteristic
that the improvement in competitiveness, which came along with
nominal devaluations, was substantially lower on export markets
than on domestic markets. Firms in these countries - contrary to
those of most other countries - were apparently inclined to pass
cost increases mostly on to export prices, even if thereby the
chances for higher external shipments were omitted, - a behaviour
which contrasts to the hope of reducing the trade deficits of these
countries.
36. If the 197 6 development in real exchange rates should continue - a
goal which seems suitable to diminish international balance of-110-
payments problems - it is unavoidable that nominal exchange rates
have to be flexible in the future, i. e. free of all intenventions.
Only in such an environment deficit countries can reallocate their
resources in favour of export branches. Attempts to stop this
would, sooner or later, have negative impacts on total employ-
ment and - in the case of accomodating monetary policy - would
reinforce inflation as well as exchange rate changes. Along with
this the surplus countries should avoid all measures designed to
limit increasing competition from abroad.
V. Need for International Coordination of Economic Policy?
37. International consultations on economic policy problems in the
near future - particularly the London conference in May 1977 -
will concentrate on the question whether and to what extent the
"strong" economies should further boost the upswing and, by
that, whether they could help to diminish the external imbalances
between "strong" and "weak" countries.
38. The fundamental idea behind the international coordination approach
- as developed by the Carter administration and supported par-
ticularly by the OECD - seems to be that the "strong" countries
should play their part as engines of the world economy with more
energy than they have done in 1976: intensifying monetary and
fiscal "go" measures in "strong" countries in order to stimulate
demand - especially for imports - seems to be more sensible
than curbing the import demand of "weak" countries by means of
unemployment-creating "stop" measures. According to this view,
the outcome should be a worldwide proliferation of expansionary
impulses from the major economies instead of a preservation of
large divergencies in the economic performance between surplus
and deficit countries.-111-
39. However, the concept of short-term stimulating demand in "strong"
countries as well as the concept of austerity measures in "weak"
countries are subject to the same criticism: they mainly rest upon
customary Keynesian-type demand management methods, i. e.
monetary and fiscal policy instruments are - incorrectly - assigned
to the balance-of-payments target and adjustments via changes in
relative prices - notably of (real) exchange rates - are considered
to be more or less irrelevant.
Therefore, in comparing the coordination approach with the strategy
of stable economic expansion - as outlined before - it becomes clear
that internationally "concerted" reflationary efforts hamper medium-
run adjustment processes, as far as they are bound for short-term
effects.
The coordination approach stresses the need for international
economic solidarity mainly in order to ease the precarious situation
of the deficit countries. In contrast to that, a strategy of stable ex-
pansion will primarily strengthen the adjustment forces within the
"strong" as well as the "weak" countries and - by that - will
diminish the international structural imbalances.
40. As such a medium-term strategy has not yet been implemented, the
efforts to do this should be intensified. If economic policy makers
follow this line, expansionary measures of "strong" countries, e.g.
extending public investment in infrastructure or in education or
permanent tax reductions for private investors, may indeed be
sensible, in other words: these measures should be growth-oriented
instead of demand-oriented.
Additional stimulating impulses are primarily suitable in those
"strong" countries where the growth rate of real public expenditure
remained below the rate of potential GNP growth in 197 6 - like in
West Germany - or where it is going to undershoot the respective
rate for 1977. If a change - e. g. a reduction - of the public share-112-
of GNP is required, it should be brought about in the medium,
not in the short run. Thus, 1977 will not be the year of balancing
public budgets; consolidation will be the task of a period when the
upswing will have got sustained momentum.
Reflationary measures should not only contribute to increase the
utilization of resources, but should also - in combination with
an effectively operating system of flexible prices, wages, interest
rates and exchange rates - support necessary shifts of resources
between the internal and external sector, the public and private
sector and between consumption and investment.
In order ID avoid new inflationary effects the desired fiscal stimuli
have to be financed by the capital market without central bank
accomodation; i. e. monetary policy has to remain stabilization-
oriented.
41. The fiscal measures of the US and Japanese governments as well
as the - intended - measures in West Germany include elements
which fulfill the postulated properties of being growth-oriented
and being backed by a cautious monetary policy.
However, the increasing imports of the major countries will not
considerably ease the balance of payments situation of the deficit
countries, because the "weak" countries will only get a small
share of the whole expansionary impact; thus , the contribution
for reducing external imbalances will be fairly limited.
42. International credits should be supplied for facilitating the
necessary structural adjustment in the deficit countries. This
instrument has to be preferred to any kind of trade restrictions,
such as import quotas. Private as well as official credits should
be more market-oriented, and they should not be used to preserve
inadequate exchange rates. Credit conditions will be the more
favourable for the borrowers the more the international lenders-113-
can trust in a moderate, stable course of monetary and fiscal
policy in the borrowing country. The method of the International
Monetary Fund to impose certain additional conditions for keeping
the economic policy of deficit countries under control, seems to
be helpful.
4 3. To summarize: The best way for achieving a sustained worldwide
upswing is to employ a rational strategy of economic policy in
each country, which comprises
- a steady, moderate course of monetary policy which is geared
to further reducing inflation; steadiness should materialize not
only in the achievement of certain monetary targets per year
but also in the elimination of significant fluctuations of current
money supply during the year;
- wage settlements which are aligned to smaller increases of
real wages than of labour productivity; this will considerably
improve the conditions for higher employment; agreements
on moderate nominal wage increases - e. g. in the context
of a voluntary incomes policy - should be supported;
- flexible exchange rates not only as a means of matching inter-
national inflation differentials, but also to effectuate real ex-
change rate changes which are needed for reducing external
imbalances and - as far as necessary -
- fiscal policy measures to strengthen structural adjustment
processes, i. e. to support economic growth.
Thus, international coordination of economic policy should
essentially mean a harmonization of the efforts to overcome the
national economic problems of each country by applying the same
strategy. Reflationary programs and international credits are only
sensible if they support internal and international structural ad-
justments instead of preserving outdated demand structures in
deficit countries as well as in surplus countries.